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Summary 
This paper examines the role parliaments have played in Indonesia and Nigeria, two Third 
Wave democracies, with regard to the democratization of the armed forces. The key ques-
tions asked in the study are: Under what conditions do these two legislatures come to mat-
ter as actors and arenas of promoting military reform and curtailing the military’s reserved 
domains? How and to what extent do Indonesian and Nigerian legislatures de facto exer-
cise oversight over the armed forces? What strategies do they apply in this process? Ana-
lytically, under which logics of action do these parliaments reorganize civil-military relations 
and what interactive patterns have emerged? Departing from a combination of rationalist 
and reflexivist theoretical arguments on social interaction, the study explores parliamen-
tary-military interaction from a within-case and between-cases perspective. By tracing the 
role of parliaments in military reform within several issue-areas and three consecutive 
phases, the paper identifies several key factors determining parliamentary performance. 
The first is the mode of regime change. The second is the presence of formal and informal 
institutional capacities of legislatures to pursue military reform in various issue areas. Final-
ly, we look at ideational dispositions of institutional and individual actors enabling or impair-
ing legislatures from establishing and exercising democratic control of the armed forces. 
Although the Indonesian legislature has contributed more decisively to military reform than 
the Nigerian Congress, the empirical evidence is even in this case ambivalent. After a 
short phase of normative opening enabling the Indonesian legislature to develop actor 
capacity in the field of military reform, the interaction soon reversed into ideational competi-
tion between pro and anti-reformist arguments limiting, in the following phases, both the 
progress of military reform and parliamentary formal and informal capacity for oversight. An 
increasing convergence of normative predispositions is finally the outcome of interaction 
between legislators and the military institution in Indonesia. This is the result of an upsurge 
of nationalist populism providing the common ground for “normative localization” that 
means the adaptation of external norms of democratic control of the armed forces to the 
Indonesian “cognitive prior” and ongoing ideational context. In contrast to the Indonesian 
case, stagnant military reform in Nigeria and limited actor capacity in interacting with the 
military by the Nigerian Congress is the outcome of interactive dynamics based on “mimet-
ic adaptation” to external norms. This form of normative isomorphism is responsible for a 
“thin” adoption of democratic norms of military reform and oversight and to a marginal role 
for Nigerian legislature in this process. Our findings show that parliaments’ capacity to 
shape reform outcomes and control the military is higher if they were active in the regime 
change; if they directly participate and even initiate bargaining and discursive processes 
with the military in the course of transition; and if they have internalized external norms of 
democratic control of armed forces on both normative and pragmatic grounds.  
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Zusammenfassung 
Das vorliegende Papier untersucht den Beitrag von Parlamenten zur Militärreform in Indo-
nesien und Nigeria. Bei beiden Staaten handelt es sich um neue Demokratien, die im 
Rahmen der dritten Demokratisierungswelle entstanden. Zentrale Fragestellungen der 
Studie sind: Unter welchen Bedingungen spielen Parlamente als Akteure und Arenen eine 
wichtige Rolle bei der Reform des Militärs und der Beschneidung von „reserved domains“ 
der Streitkräfte. Wie kontrollieren sie das Militär, welcher Strategien bedienen sie sich dazu 
und welche Interaktionsmuster entstehen dabei? Unter welchen Handlungslogiken verän-
dern Parlamente zivil-militärische Beziehungen und welche Interaktionsmuster entstehen 
dabei? Ausgehend von einer Kombination rationalistischer und reflexiver theoretischer 
Argumente untersucht die Studie die in beiden Ländern nach der Demokratisierung ent-
standenen Interaktionsmuster zwischen Parlamenten und dem Militär aus einer diachronen 
und einer synchronen vergleichenden Perspektive. Sie identifiziert dabei mehrere zentrale, 
die Performanz der Parlamente bestimmende Faktoren: Die Art und Weise des Regime-
wechsels, das Vorhandensein formaler und informeller Handlungskompetenzen zur Um-
setzung der Militärreform in unterschiedlichen Politikfeldern sowie die kognitiven Dispositi-
onen institutioneller und individueller Akteure, die sich fördernd oder hemmend auf die 
Parlamente auswirken, das Militär einer demokratischen Kontrolle zu unterziehen. Obwohl 
das indonesische Parlament einen deutlich sichtbareren Beitrag zur Militärreform leistete, 
müssen indes auch seine Leistungen in dieser Hinsicht als noch ambivalent bewertet wer-
den. Nach einer kurzen Phase der normativen Öffnung, in der die indonesische Legislative 
Handlungsmacht in Hinblick auf Militärreform erlangte, degenerierten die Interaktionen 
zwischen dem Parlament und den Streitkräften in einen Modus der kompetitiven Argumen-
tation, der nur noch partielle Fortschritte bei der Reform des Militärs zuließ und die formel-
len und informellen Kontrollkompetenzen des Militärs gravierend beschnitt. In einer dritten 
Phase kam es zu einer zunehmenden kognitiven und normativen Konvergenz zwischen 
Parlamentariern und dem Militärestablishment. Die ideelle Grundlage dafür bot ein zuneh-
mender nationalistischer Populismus, der das Ergebnis von Normlokalisierung ist. Anders 
als in Indonesien lassen sich für Nigeria weniger Wandel und deutlich weniger Militärre-
formen beobachten. Sie sind das Resultat geringer parlamentarischer Handlungsmacht 
und einer lediglich mimetischen Aneignung externer Normen in Hinblick auf die demokrati-
sche Kontrolle des Militärs. 
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1. Introduction: Parliaments and Civil-Military  
Relations 
As the embodiment of people’s sovereignty, parliaments are the central political institution 
of democracies. Not surprisingly, thus, the literature on parliaments in established Western 
democracies is legion. Much less comprehensive, however, is research on legislatures in 
non-Western political systems. To some extent this reflects the fact that until the arrival of 
the Third Wave of Democratization (Diamond & Plattner 1996; Huntington 1991) in the 
regions of the Global South in the 1980s, the majority of these polities were autocracies. 
Their parliaments, often denounced in academic studies and the media as rubber stamps 
and democratic facades, did not seem to be worthy objects for serious research. Puzzling, 
however, is the fact that even after democratic transition parliaments remained grossly 
understudied. Political scientists neither paid much attention to their contribution to regime 
change and the institutionalization of democracy nor to their role in the process of consoli-
dating the new democracies.  
But not only transition literature neglected parliaments. Also civil-military relations research 
largely ignored the role of legislatures in civilizing the military in new democracies (Aguero 
1995, Bruneau & McLeod 1986; Linz and Stephan 1996; Obi 2008; Omotola 2009; Pion 
Berlin 2001; Trinkunas 2005). Especially in “pacted” transitions (that is regime change 
based on a compromise between elites of the ancien régime and reformists), the military is 
often retarding, diluting and even blocking democratic reforms. Since coups have become 
internationally discredited as a form of changing the government, and may evoke sanctions 
by the international community, they are no longer the primary form of military intervention. 
But while the armed forces may have lost the leverages to restore the ancien régime, they 
are nevertheless tenaciously clinging to their corporate interests and trying to protect the 
reserved domains they were able to carve out for themselves during the preceding authori-
tarian order. Recent civil-military relations research is thus less concerned with coups, but 
more with the new channels the military seeks to exploit for safeguarding its spheres of 
influence (Croissant, Kühn, Chamber & Wolf 2010; Heiduk 2011; Mietzner 2009, 2011; 
Croissant & Kühn 2007; Croissant, Kühn & Lorenz 2012). The military’s continuing political 
influence, especially on policy-making – even if exerted informally and behind the scenes – 
is one major factor why many transition countries have so far failed to consolidate democ-
racy and have become enduring hybrid political systems (Carothers 2002; Levitsky & Way 
2002).  
However, more recent studies on Southeast Asian parliaments challenge the conventional 
wisdom that legislatures are largely non-existent as actors in processes of democratic 
transition and consolidation (Rüland, Jürgenmeyer, Nelson & Ziegenhain 2005; Ziegenhain 
2008; Schneier 2009). While we do not contest the conventional wisdom that especially 
civil society movements have been major catalysts of political change in the process of 
transition from autocratic to democratic political systems (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986; 
Przeworski 1991; Merkel 2010), there is also substantial evidence that legislatures played 
a greater role in this process than the existing literature suggests. This at least can be 
concluded from a closer examination of the legislatures of the Philippines, Indonesia and 
South Korea in the process of regime change (Rüland, Jürgenmeyer, Nelson & Ziegenhain 
2005). These studies also suggest that legislatures become increasingly assertive after 
regime change and seek to establish greater control over the executive. Parliaments’ role 
manifests in several ways: as institutional facilitator of reformist ideas; as institutional arena 
of interaction enabling argumentative and bargaining processes between societal groups, 
various political actors and the military; through its formal capacities to legislate, oversee 
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and make decisions on the budget. Many of the new legislatures hold oversight more than 
legislation for an important requisite for avoiding the resurgence of dictatorial regimes.  
Moreover, such new insights from research on parliaments converge with the shift in the 
civil-military literature from an older, much broader concept of civilian control (Huntington 
1957; Finer 1962; Janowitz 1965) to a more specific approach known as democratic con-
trol of the armed forces as it is laid down in the paradigm of Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
(Beeson & Bellamy 2008: 18; Born, Fluri & Johnson 2003; Cawthra & Luckham 2003;  
Cottey, Edmunds & Forster 2002). The latter opens the way for the acknowledgement, at 
least normatively, of a more vital role for parliaments as well as other societal groups in 
democratizing the military and shaping the process of policy formulation in the defense 
sector (Bruneau & Matei 2008: 911; Feaver 2005).  
Cottey, Edmund and Foster (2000) have argued that establishing democratic control of the 
armed forces, usually involves two stages: First generation reforms denote the process of 
establishing the principles and structures for oversight and transparency of military affairs, 
while second generation reforms seek to entrench and consolidate democratic governance 
of the military sector (Cottey, Edmunds & Foster 2000). According to this paradigm, par-
liaments are central institutional actors in both phases of military reform. This study ex-
plores under which conditions and how parliaments in two important Third Wave democra-
cies have come to matter as institutional actors promoting military reform and what factors 
constrain or enable their reformist praxis. In our analysis, we highlight factors and process-
es that have not been explicitly accounted for in policy blueprints or have been dismissed 
as “defective” or “perverse” outcomes of transformation processes in academic circles. Not 
surprisingly, our understanding of the problem at hand is indebted to an historical-
constructivist framework that builds upon four assumptions: (a) all processes of institutional 
change are historical in nature which, for our investigation, means that the extent to which 
parliaments develop reformist/democratic mindsets and oversight capacity is determined 
by past institutional structures and the mode of transition; (b) ideas of all kinds, past mem-
ories, myths, experiences and cultural beliefs have a significant impact (both constitutive 
and causal) on how parliaments and military together with other political and societal ac-
tors behave and decide with regard to military reform; (c) these ideational resources do not 
exist in a vacuum but themselves are also historically and spatially contextualized;  
(d) interaction as an explanatory mechanism is central to understanding how institutional 
change takes place and where its limits are. It is through interaction that old or new, pro-
gressive or anti-reformist ideas as well as structural constraints are bringing about new 
patterns. Against this background, we seek to answer the following key questions in our 
research:  
• Under what conditions do legislatures come to matter as actors and arenas of 
promoting military reform and curtailing the military’s reserved domains? 
• How and to what extent do they exercise oversight over the armed forces? What 
strategies do they apply in this process? And 
• Under which logics of action do parliaments reorganize civil-military relations and 
what interactive patterns emerge?  
These questions have guided our cross-regional comparative study of two major regional 
powers, Indonesia and Nigeria. The subsequent overview about the project design and the 
empirical results will be organized in three major steps. A first step briefly introduces the 
theoretical and methodological premises of the project. This is followed by a second step in 
which major research findings will be presented country-wise. In a third and concluding 
step, we summarize the research findings and formulate several propositions as potential 
points of departure for more broad-based quantitative and qualitative comparative re-
search. 
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2.  Logics of Social Action and Parliamentary-Military 
 Relations 
2.1. Theorizing Social Action: Strategies Meet Norms and Arguments 
In this paper, we distinguish two major explanations of social action based on instrumental 
and normative rationalities. They are identical with a rationalist agenda and a constructivist 
perspective. The rationalist research agenda rests on a “consequentialist” logic of action 
(March & Olsen 1989). Based on this logic, actors have fixed interests and act strategically 
in order to realize their preferences. Rational choice is utility and efficiency driven, purpos-
ive and focusing on the outcome of action. Actors bargain with each other in order to max-
imize their gains at the least possible costs.  
The normative rationality departs from the observation that actors do not exclusively act as 
utility maximizers but may also be conditioned by ideational factors such as rules, norms, 
identities and social knowledge following a logic of “appropriateness” that manifests in 
“norm-based action” (March & Olsen 1989). Not only material factors, but also ideational 
factors are thus regarded as constitutive for the interests and identity of actors. Moreover, 
many constructivists also stress that preferences and identities are not fixed and exoge-
nously given, but created intersubjectively in a mutually constitutive process between so-
cial structure and agency. This means that, on the one hand, human agents do not act 
independently from their social environment and its collectively shared system of mean-
ings. On the other hand, it means that human agency reproduces and creates culture 
through daily practices, discourse and social learning (Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein 
1996; Risse 2000). This leads constructivist literature to further differentiate between the 
resilient nature of the logic of “appropriateness” (Sending 2002) and the transformative 
potential of the logic of “arguing” (Risse 2000). While deep cognitive structures, normative 
commitments and social identities are the background for the logic of “appropriateness,” 
these factors do not encourage institutional change, identity change or adaptation but ra-
ther overemphasize the stability of social structures. When actors follow this logic, it is 
unlikely that they reflexively or pragmatically reframe their interests and identities but be-
have in conformity with the latter, thereby reproducing them. For change to happen, actors 
have to challenge deeply internalized “intersubjective” structures which is possible by fol-
lowing the logic of “arguing.” The latter manifests in “communicative action” and denotes a 
process of truth-seeking, in which actors challenge validity claims of causal statements and 
seek to “find a communicative consensus about their understanding of a situation as well 
as justifications for the principles and norms guiding their action” (Risse 2000: 7). “Arguing” 
is thus a deliberative process in search of the better argument. It is “as goal-oriented as 
strategic interaction, but the goal is not to attain one’s fixed preferences, but to seek a 
reasoned consensus” (ibid.: 7). It implies a two-sided process of persuasion in which both 
protagonists are prepared to change their worldviews, beliefs, interests and identities. “Ar-
guing,” however, is highly conditional. Actors tend to engage in “arguing” in times of great 
insecurity, when all existing truths are at stake. Moreover, “arguing” presupposes an ideal 
speech situation, that is, a common life world including a modicum of shared meanings 
and symbols, the absence of hegemony, an ability to empathize and to recognize the other 
as equal (ibid.: 9).  
“Rhetorical action” is another mode of interaction which builds upon both the strategic ra-
tionality of actors and their argumentative and persuasive capacity. By “rhetorical action” 
actors seek to persuade others to change their beliefs, interests and identities without be-
ing prepared to be persuaded themselves by better arguments of others  
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(Schimmelfennig 2003: 199-206). The use of arguments in “rhetorical action” is thus in-
strumental, aiming at maximizing actors’ goals within a strategic mode of communication. It 
emphasizes the capacity of actors to argue and persuade each other not necessarily on 
normative but rather on pragmatic, instrumental grounds (Giddens 1984). Thus, political 
actors can behave argumentatively though still following the logic of consequentialism.  
Rhetorical action can take three forms: “Competitive argumentation,” “controversial argu-
mentation” and “pseudo-competitive argumentation.” “Competitive argumentation” is condi-
tional upon the existence of a consensus between actors about the “kinds of grounds” or 
“warrants” while the grounds themselves are in dispute. “Competitive argumentation” pre-
supposes purposive action as it relies upon the existence of conflicts of interest expressed 
in different argumentative positions and persuasion strategies that compete against each 
other in defining the problems and the solutions. However, in our view a consensus over 
warrants presupposes the existence of a basic normative agreement among actors. “Con-
troversial argumentation” denotes an interaction in which actors basically disagree about 
everything, their claims, grounds and principles. Finally, a third type brings about “pseudo-
competitive argumentation” when the parties appear to agree over their warrants but by 
attributing them different meaning actors fail finding a consensus (Schimmelfennig 2003: 
211). 
The logics of “consequentialism” and “arguing” are fruitfully synergized in the concept of 
“rhetorical action.” Due to this greater analytical compatibility with our overarching argu-
ment that stresses an historical-constructivist approach to legislative-military relations, we 
will thus consider the instrumental aspects of action by adopting the concept of “rhetorical 
action” and not relying on a purely rationalist notion of “bargaining” or “strategic action”. 
We further argue that the way as well as the sequencing in which “rhetorical,” “norm-
based” and “communicative” types of action interact with one another may explain different 
institutional paths and depths of military reforms in Indonesia and Nigeria and varying de-
grees to which parliaments played in it.  
 
2.2. How does interaction shape legislature-military relations? 
In the following, we stress four interactive mechanisms explaining either change or stale-
mate in legislative-military relations leading to the establishment of democratic control of 
the armed forces through parliaments or limiting the latter. 
 
Challenging old grounds through “communicative action” 
The first path to change occurs when severe crises and situations of great insecurity open 
the space for actors to contest established “intersubjective structures” facilitating process-
es of “communicative action.” The latter may result in a new normative agreement, one 
which is believed to cope better with the challenges a society faces. (Liberal) democracy 
and military reform are usually major elements of the new normative consensus in pro-
cesses of political transition. But in most cases the new normative order is preliminary and 
up to probation, especially if the new norms are alien and propagated by foreign norm 
entrepreneurs. The new democratic norms only consolidate if they meet the expectations 
associated with them (Legro 2000). As transformative processes generated by crises are 
usually turbulent, we do not expect “communicative action” to lead to an immediate whole-
sale ideational and institutional transformation, but rather to a lengthy process with uncer-
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tain outcome and junctures which either accelerate or impair democratic consolidation. 
Although political actors may have reached a new normative agreement in an episode of 
“communicative action,” the turbulences concomitant to political transformation indicate 
that disagreement prevails over the institutional arrangements in the new order. Such dis-
agreements represent power struggles in the emerging democracy. Competing elites strive 
for institutional arrangements conducive to them, pitting against each other political actors 
representing a reformist agenda and conservatives seeking to preserve their privileges. As 
a result, they subsequently become engaged in a process of “rhetorical action” that indi-
cates a shift in the scope of argumentation from moral claims to pragmatic decisions on 
institutional reforms and new rules.  
Transforming old structures through “competitive argumentation”  
If “communicative action” is followed by “competitive argumentation” over the institutional 
arrangements of the new democracy and the scope and depth of military reform, several 
transformative processes are possible. Under favorable conditions “competitive argumen-
tation” may evolve into an identity change of actors and even wholesale ideational trans-
formation. Favorable conditions for such a development exist if the new democracy per-
forms well,1 in other words, meets the expectations associated with it, and in the process 
strengthens reformist forces. 
But “competitive argumentation” may also end in stalemate. A stalemate occurs if conces-
sions between the contending reformist and conservative forces over institutional ar-
rangements are exhausted. We do not disregard that the stalemate may be broken and 
evolve into a renewed process of “competitive argumentation” with the prospect of further 
reforms at a later stage. But this is a highly conditional process and thus a rather unlikely 
path of change. It presupposes that favorable conditions for reformist processes re-
emerge: Notable performance improvements of the new democracy which create new win-
win situations and the appearance of new, more compromising actors on both sides of the 
game. However, if the momentum for “communicative action” was short, weak and mini-
malist, if spoilers persistently question the fragile new normative consensus and if the 
emerging new normative order does not meet the expectations associated with it, then new 
democracies cannot consolidate and the stalemate in legislative-military relations with 
regard to the military reforms may degenerate into “controversial” or “pseudo-competitive 
argumentation.” 
Re-legitimizing old grounds through “constitutive localization” 
Yet, such a development may result in long-term political instability. Given the high costs of 
such an outcome, we assume that it is rational for actors to avoid it. This leads to alterna-
tive (hybrid) paths of interaction. One of them is the creation of a new normative consen-
sus by fusing elements of the competing old, locally established norms and the new set of 
norms often originating abroad. In this process of “constitutive localization” (Acharya 2004, 
2009) previously competing actors construct a new normative third, a hybrid normative 
order which presumably is closer to the “cognitive prior” (ibid.) than to the new (externally 
propagated) set of norms. The authors’ interpretation of the concept of “constitutive locali-
zation,” originally proposed and empirically used by Amitav Acharya in a somewhat differ-
                                                            
1  “Performing well” does not only mean that the new democracy performs economically well or is less corrupt than the 
authoritarian predecessor government. It also meets expectations if it provides adequate avenues for the citizenry to 
criticize governmental mal-performance and thereby induce political decision-makers to credibly amend governance 
deficiencies. 
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ent vein, is a process which in fact modernizes and, coincidentally, legitimizes the old  
(locally accepted) norms by associating them with the new norms. This is done through a 
strategic process of framing the new norms, grafting and pruning them in an open public 
discourse so that they become compatible with the “cognitive prior” (ibid.).  
Localization thus entails a limited change of identity among actors, which finds its expres-
sion in some institutional change which deviates from the “cognitive prior.” But as “localiza-
tion” in the first place legitimizes the stalemate which ended “competitive argumentation” 
on the basis of a new normative consensus favoring the “cognitive prior,” no further reform-
ist progress may be expected. In terms of military reform this means that the democracy 
norm is localized by local actors and agreement exists that the level of military reform 
achieved so far fits the localized form of democracy (or degree of democratization) and, 
hence, does not need to be driven further. In fact, future behavior of actors is primarily 
norm-based, but newly abiding norms acquired a locally defined content and scope. 
By drawing from Snyder’s elite persuasion hypothesis (Snyder 2000), we argue that espe-
cially nationalism may create a discursive context by which alien norms of liberal democra-
cy, including military reform, are grafted in a way that the latter will be eventually stalled. 
According to Snyder, new democracies are often characterized by intense jockeying for 
political power between old and reformist elites. As a “doctrine for the people, but not nec-
essarily by the people” (Snyder 2000: 36) nationalism is attractive especially for old elites, 
because it allows them to respond to the opening of the political space without fully grant-
ing civic rights (ibid). In the absence of strong and mature democratic institutions, and due 
to strong historical and ideational legacies closely associated with the process of decoloni-
zation and state-building, even reformist forces have no alternative but to resort to nation-
alist populism in order to mobilize popular support. The ideology of nationalism may thus 
re-value and re-produce ideas about the military’s exceptionalist role in the process of 
state-building and thereby strengthen beliefs that fundamental military reform is tanta-
mount to weakening the nation’s resilience. The consequence is a very limited political 
space and a reluctant quest by reformists for enforcing full-fledged democratic oversight 
over the armed forces. 
While localization may offer an exit from a stalemated process of “competitive argumenta-
tion,” it may also be a direct response by local actors to external normative pressures. This 
is the case where “communicative action” is leap-frogged due to a deeply entrenched 
“cognitive prior,” where crisis does not decisively shatter the expectations associated with 
the old normative order, where conservative elites have an edge over reformists, but where 
at the same time the political order is open enough to enable public discourse over the 
normative underpinnings of society.  
Persistence of old structures through “isomorphic behaviour” 
A final possible response to external norm pressures combining strategic and cognitive 
aspects is isomorphic behavior. The latter entails the mimetic adaptation to new (mostly 
alien) norms by local actors (Meyer & Rowan 1977; DiMaggio & Powell 1991; Meyer 2005; 
Scott 2008). This means that the actors representing the pre-existing set of ideas merely 
mimic institutional change by only adapting the latter’s rhetoric but leaving the normative 
orthodoxy virtually untouched. The likelihood of isomorphic behavior increases if the new 
(alien) ideas do not find local advocates who vocally champion them. This is often the case 
in an autocratic environment or where in hybrid political systems public debate is muzzled 
due to restrictive regulations and/or where civil society is weak (Bruneau & Trinkunas 
2008; Clunan 2008:31). Isomorphic behavior is a direct outcome of political transition, but 
14 
theoretically may also follow a stalemated process of “competitive argumentation,” if the 
“cognitive prior” is still very strong and the normative consensus preceding “competitive 
argumentation” was only a very thin veneer cast over the pre-existing set of norms. Mere 
rhetorical adaptation and instrumental adaptation prevents any reflexive and argumentative 
dynamics over the new norms. No willingness or cognitive ability to genuinely change the 
old cognitive structure by local actors is possible in this case. As a result, isomorphic be-
havior is often characterized by a notable rhetoric-action gap. We expect that military re-
form is highly superficial in this case and not prone to major changes.  
By analyzing and contrasting the empirical dynamics of Indonesia and Nigeria against 
these theoretical reflections, we could identify in the following study that different modes of 
interaction have been at work in Indonesia and Nigeria between legislatures and the mili-
tary institution. Distinct logics of action and sequencing of interaction account for variation 
in the capacity of legislatures to act as agents of change. Consequently, this led to different 
patterns of parliament-military relations in each country along with manifestations of une-
qual strength and actorness of legislatures in pursuing military reform and oversight. In the 
case of Indonesia, we can trace a sequence of interactions which starts with a moment of 
“communicative action,” to be followed by “competitive argumentation.” When “competitive 
argumentation” ended in a stalemate, legislators and military officers created a new norma-
tive foundation through “localization.” This explains why Indonesian military reform has 
progressed to a certain extent, but in the end remained a half-way house. In Nigeria, politi-
cal transition was not the result of a process of “communicative action,” however short and 
partial, but merely the result of isomorphic behavior. A parliament did not exist at the time 
of regime change and when it was re-established, it was only able to contribute peripheral-
ly to a rather limited reformation of the military institution.  
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3.  Case Selection and Comparative Approach  
This study was designed as a cross-regional small-n qualitative study on the basis of most 
similar case with different outcome (MSDO) design (Berg-Schlosser 1999). Indonesia and 
Nigeria share a number of salient structural similarities which qualify the two cases for 
MSDO. Both countries underwent regime change at virtually the same time in 1998, in both 
cases regime change was “pacted,” both are presidential political systems, both have an 
entrenched military sector with strong corporate interests, both are resource-rich countries 
and both are multi-ethnic societies with Islam and Christianity as the two major religious 
denominations.2 That Indonesia and Nigeria are also major regional powers with potential 
influence on their neighbors, also qualifies them as “most important cases” (Friedrich & 
Kratochwil 2010). Variance exists with regard to the progress of military reform which has 
been considered more advanced in Indonesia than in Nigeria. Moreover, we expected 
similar variation to exist with regard to the actorness of parliaments in the process of mili-
tary reform and democratic control of the armed forces. In order to explain different pro-
cesses of causation leading, in one case, to more and, in the other case, to significantly 
less actor capacity on the part of legislatures, we chose to focus on interaction as crucial 
causal mechanism. In that, we highlighted several factors shaping the interaction process: 
the mode of regime change; the presence of formal and informal institutional capacities of 
legislatures to pursue military reform in various issue areas, and, finally, ideational disposi-
tions of institutional and individual actors enabling or impairing legislatures from establish-
ing and exercising democratic control of the armed forces. 
Our synchronic (between-cases) comparative small-n study is complemented by a dia-
chronic comparison (within-cases) that distinguishes three time sequences within the two 
countries under study: one, the phase of regime change; second, the phase of institutional-
izing democracy and first attempts at reforming the military; and three, the phase of demo-
cratic consolidation with the objective of exercising full parliamentary control over the 
armed forces. In our view, diachronic comparison provides a more differentiated insight 
into the causation process that MSDO alone obscures. Moreover, we adopted an “abduc-
tive” research strategy (Friedrich & Kratochwil 2010) and relied on process tracing. The 
study designed thirteen issues which facilitate analysis of the complex interaction between 
the legislature and the military across the three time sequences in the two countries. These 
fields of interaction also enabled us to examine what kind of formal and informal institu-
tional capacities legislatures have had or have acquired in the process of transition in order 
to trigger military reform and exercise democratic control of the armed forces. The choice 
of the issue-areas has been derived from the literature on civil-military relations, but the 
initial selection has been inductively corrected and adapted to the findings of our empirical 
research. They include: military’s political representation, constitutional amendments, mili-
tary reform legislation, oversight practices, military organizational structure (TNI territorial 
structure), military business (or involvement in economic or developmental activities), hu-
man rights impunity and military justice system. . Finally, the cognitive prior to the reform 
process has been discussed in both cases while we examined how local and foreign ideas, 
norms and ideologies have affected the interaction process throughout the three time 
phases and thirteen case studies and ultimately shaped the outcome of interaction. 
The authors conducted field work in Indonesia between February and April 2008 and May 
and August 2009, in Nigeria in August and September 2008 and February and March 
                                                            
2  However, with 88 percent of the population compared to only about 10 percent for Christianity, Islam is clearly the 
dominant religion in Indonesia. In Nigeria, Islam (51 percent) and Christianity (48 percent) have an almost equal share 
of the population. 
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2009. Additional final information for this research report was gathered by one of the au-
thors in March and April 2010 in Indonesia. In the course of field work we interviewed 
eighty-nine legislators, active and retired military officers, civil society representatives, 
journalists and members of academia.  
Apart from a careful reading of the published and unpublished academic literature, other 
important sources of information included a thorough content analysis of opinion-leading 
newspapers in both countries. In Indonesia this was facilitated through easily accessible 
internet archives of dailies such as The Jakarta Post, The Jakarta Globe, Kompas, Suara 
Pembaruan and Media Indonesia as well as political magazines such as Tempo and Gatra. 
The Nigerian newspapers and political magazines analyzed included This Day, The Guard-
ian, Vanguard, The Punch, The Abuja Inquirer, Leadership, The Independent, as well as 
Tell and Newswatch magazines. In both countries, we were provided with access to public 
parliamentary documents such as the hansards (minutes of plenary sessions) and commit-
tee reports and minutes. We supplemented these sources of information by an analysis of 
the websites of the Indonesian and the Nigerian legislature.  
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4.  The Legislature and Military Reform in Indonesia 
The following empirical analysis rests on the theoretical premise that the interactions be-
tween the legislature and the military are driven by both cognitive as well as rationalist 
logics. This means that in the majority of cases the outcome of strategic interactions can-
not be completely dissociated from the actors’ normative dispositions. The latter is usually 
shaped by a “cognitive prior,” that is, beliefs entrenched in the collective memory  
(Assmann 2007) about what is considered appropriate behavior in a given social context. 
Before examining the interactions between the legislature and the military, we thus briefly 
sketch the normative foundation on which Indonesian regimes prior to the 1998 transition 
rested. 
 
4.1. The Indonesian “Cognitive Prior” 
Indonesia’s “cognitive prior” is largely shaped by the nationalist movement which in the 
1920s began searching for an Indonesian “Staatsidee” that can be derived from local idea-
tional sources (Reeve 1985; Simantunjak 1989; Bourchier 1999). The nationalists found 
them in the organicist underpinnings of local customary law (adat) and Javanese political 
elite culture which was strongly influenced by pre-colonial Hindu-Brahmanic court rules. 
That these ideational foundations were collectivist and anti-liberal was hardly surprising. 
Liberalism was closely associated with Dutch colonialism and collectivism was strengthen-
ing national cohesion in the struggle against the Dutch. From adat nationalists derived 
norms such as familism (kekeluargaan), harmony, consensus, unity of leaders and follow-
ers (persatuan kawulo dan gusti) (Magnis-Suseno 1997). These ideas were strengthened 
through local elite constructions such as a Javanese concept of power which – unlike 
Western concepts – was believed to be indivisible, concentrating all power in the ruler 
(Anderson 1972). Local collectivist ideas tallied well with nineteenth and early twentieth 
century European organic state theory and corporatism which nationalist leaders imported 
from Europe in an attempt to modernize and legitimize ancient local collectivist ideas  
(MacIntyre 1994; Bourchier 1999). Given the deep roots of these ideas in local elite cul-
ture, it was hardly surprising that after independence parliamentary democracy (1950-
1957) remained a short interlude (Feith 1964; Ricklefs 1993). During President Sukarno’s 
“Guided Democracy” (1957-1966) and, to a much greater extent, Suharto’s New Order 
regime (1966-1998), organicism and corporatism experienced a powerful revival and 
henceforth became the ideological foundation of the Indonesian state (King 1992;  
MacIntyre 1994). With their fervently nationalist ideological orientation, the Indonesian 
armed forces (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, ABRI) became a major bearer of 
this cognitive prior in the pre-1998 period. 
Javanese concepts of power and kingship accorded pivotal functions to the military. The 
warriors (ksatria) were the protectors of the palace and society, a notion which the Indone-
sian armed forces could persuasively cultivate due to their vanguard role in the independ-
ence struggle against the Dutch and their role in safeguarding the state against numerous 
separatist rebellions and other armed challenges (Noer 2005:173; Hendra 2007:106;  
Nainggolan 2010). In the Suharto era, the cognitive lineage of the soldiers’ elevated posi-
tion in Indonesian society found its most prominent expression in the dwi fungsi doctrine 
which accorded to the armed forces both a defense function and a social role. The ksatria 
ideal became a dominant trait of societal organization: As Mangunwijaya observed, “uni-
forms, marching, parades, mass sport and entertainment with typical militaristic ceremo-
18 
nies of glamour and national pride” were pervasive at the time (Mangunwijaya 1994:84). 
Even after regime change the socially deeply rooted military mindset survived in the form 
of the ubiquitous para-military formations of political parties (satgas) and a broad range of 
militias (laskars) (Ziv 2001:83). The separation of the military from politics, an apolitical, 
professional military force was thus viewed by many Indonesians as an alien, imported 
norm.  
Indonesia’s organicist cognitive prior and the elevated role it accorded to the military were 
strongly challenged by the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. The crisis was the external 
shock which, as theoretical literature argues (Legro 2000), erodes public trust in the exist-
ing regime and its ideological foundations. The Asian financial crisis shattered the en-
trenched expectations associated with President Suharto’s New Order regime and its ideo-
logical foundations, which promised political stability and robust economic growth. As In-
donesia’s economy faltered, with the government paralyzed and social and ethnic restive-
ness mounting, a rapidly growing reform movement did not only question President Suhar-
to’s leadership style and economic policy failure. It also rejected the organicist conception 
of statehood that placed the military in a privileged position within the Indonesian state and 
demanded a comprehensive reform of the Indonesian political system and civil-military 
relations on new ideational grounds. Due to its repressive role during the New Order period 
and flagrant human rights violations, the military was regarded as a major obstacle for 
political reform. The following case studies detail in which way and to what extent parlia-
ment became an actor and an arena in the unfolding process of political transition and the 
concomitant attempts to bring the military under civilian democratic control. 
 
4.2. Contesting Old Normative Grounds through “Communicative Action”:  
Legislature-Military Interaction during Regime Change (May 1998-1999)  
In the following, we show that the Indonesian Parliament was a central institutional actor 
and, even more so, the most crucial institutional arena of action, apart from Jakarta’s 
streets, in bringing about the downfall of Suharto and initiating political liberalization. The 
fusion of massive public protests against Suharto’s regime and parliamentary mobilization 
as mediator in the leadership crisis during May 1998 created optimum conditions for legis-
lature-military relations to experience a short but important phase of “communicative” in-
teraction. But what were the factors conducive to a short-lived “communicative action” and 
enabling the Indonesian parliament to play a decisive role in future military reform and to 
establish a level of democratic control over TNI?   
The Limits and Consequences of “Communicative Action” 
The Indonesian legislature played a more pivotal role in the process of regime change than 
is usually acknowledged in the theoretical transition literature. Often derided as a rubber 
stamp, with the function of providing a democratic façade to Suharto’s authoritarian re-
gime, the DPR’s creeping emancipation in the 1990s went largely unnoticed by the majori-
ty of observers. Ironically, the DPR began to shed its reputation of a subaltern body at a 
time when the Speaker was a retired general who belonged to the military faction in the 
House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) which at the time held seven-
ty-five of the House’s 500 seats. Speaker Wahono was close to circles in the officer corps 
who felt increasingly alienated by the indiscriminate and increasingly frequent interventions 
of President Suharto into military promotions which served no other purpose than to pre-
empt military challenges to his rule (Honna 2003). These officers clandestinely discussed 
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reforms with the objective of re-professionalizing the armed forces years before Suharto 
was forced to step down (Honna 2003; Sebastian 2006). 
This constellation set the stage for a moment of “communicative action” between the civil-
ian student-led reform movement, the legislature and major factions in the armed forces 
who realized that the Asian financial crisis had severely weakened the legitimacy of the 
Suharto regime and that the post-crisis Indonesian state needs to be built on a new norma-
tive foundation. A dialogue between the leadership of the armed forces, the student pro-
testers and the legislature came in motion, after military units close to Suharto’s son-in-law, 
Lt.-Gen. Prabowo had opened fire on demonstrating students in front of Trisakti University 
on 12 May 1998 and after the massive riots of 13 and 14 May 1998 in Jakarta which are 
widely believed to have been masterminded by Prabowo and his supporters in the military 
(O’Rourke 2002; Honna 2003). The subsequent occupation of the premises of the DPR by 
some 2,000 student protesters further spurred the dialogue between groups which for 
much of the previous time were at odds with each other. In the legislature, which after the 
1997 parliamentary elections was more than ever dominated by Suharto’ Golkar Party, 
especially the intra-parliamentary opposition of the pro-Islamic United Development Party 
(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) and the Democratic Party of Indonesia (Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI) shared with the students the perception that the crisis was a 
“blessing” as it offered a chance to correct the “huge imbalance in [the country’s] power 
distribution.”3 While behind the scenes Commander-in-Chief General Wiranto pressured 
President Suharto to resign, DPR Speaker Harmoko, a long-time close ally of Suharto, 
publicly defected from the regime. At this point, Suharto was left with no other choice than 
to step down, a decision he announced on 22 May 1998 (Ufen 2002; Ziegenhain 2008). 
Yet, it would go too far to characterize the broad-based anti-Suharto alliance as a full-
fledged process of “communicative action.” First of all, there was no level playing field 
between the armed forces, the legislature and the reformasi movement. The latter’s activi-
ties including the takeover of the Indonesian legislature by student protesters was largely 
dependent on toleration by the armed forces. And second, the armed forces neither treated 
the student-led reform movement nor the legislators as equal partners, as a communica-
tive mode of interaction would have required. Rather they perceived them as short-term 
allies to resolve a rapidly deteriorating political crisis by forcing the country’s embattled 
president to resign. Moreover, while there was agreement that the country’s political sys-
tem must be reformed, the new normative consensus was thin and fragile as it did not go 
beyond rather diffuse ideas about a more democratic order. With the new President 
Bacharuddin Habibie’s decision to unilaterally usher in far-reaching democratic reforms 
such as reinstating freedom of speech, assembly, and of the press, the liberty to form polit-
ical parties, the release of political prisoners, a bold decentralization program and the an-
nouncement of free elections soon after coming to power, it became clear that for the im-
mediate future there was no way back to the ideational status quo ante. Habibie’s decision 
to democratize the Indonesian polity may have been strongly guided by tactical considera-
tions to beef up his fragile presidency, but it certainly reaffirmed the newly forged consen-
sus that the post-Suharto state would rest on democratic norms. 
                                                            
3 The Jakarta Post, 9 May 1998. 
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From “Communicative Action” to “Competitive Argumentation”  
Suharto’s resignation ushered in a protracted and highly contested process of political 
reforms. The episode of “communicative action” which brought together military soft liners, 
student protesters, civil society and the more progressive elements in the legislature in a 
tacit, albeit short-lived alliance in the final days of the New Order ended soon after Suharto 
resigned and was replaced by Vice President Habibie. What concrete form a post-Suharto 
political order should take was subsequently fiercely debated and became an object of 
“competitive argumentation” in which the protagonists mobilized the streets and even re-
verted to violence. Rhetorical competition led to the achievement of several political re-
forms that strengthened the political stature of the DPR and set the stage for first genera-
tion military reforms.  
In the process the military initially sought to protect its corporate interests by embarking on 
a tactical retreat. In a document entitled Paradigma Baru (New Paradigm), it announced 
the withdrawal of the armed forces from active politics by transforming ABRI’s sociopolitical 
staff into territorial staff. Military officers holding positions in the civilian bureaucracy were 
asked to resign from the military, the police and military were separated, the military’s ties 
with Golkar Party were severed in order to ensure neutrality in the legislative elections 
scheduled for June 1999 and the name of ABRI was changed into Tentara Nasional Indo-
nesia (TNI) (Hafidz 2006: 118-119). 
Yet, for the reformist movement the military’s internal reforms were only a beginning. The 
ensuing “competitive argumentation” between reformists and the military increasingly took 
the form of a power struggle centering on the new polity’s institutional arrangements. That 
the legislature became a major player in this process must be attributed to two factors. 
First, one of the major issues at stake was the military’s continued representation in the 
House of Representatives (DPR) as well as the country’s supreme political body, the Con-
sultative People’s Assembly (Majlis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR). And, second, at the 
time of the breakdown of the ancien régime, a functioning legislature existed which, even 
though dominated by legislators beholden to the ancien régime, had achieved a certain 
degree of political autonomy and contributed to the dictator’s downfall. It had a proven 
committee structure, working routines based on established rules of procedure (peraturan 
tata tertib), a secretariat and the core of an expert staff and parliamentary services  
(Ziegenhain 2008; Sherlock 2010).  
The military’s representation in the country’s legislatures became an issue immediately 
after the Habibie administration announced parliamentary elections. The elections required 
a new election law that would ensure free and fair polls. Amid intense agitation by reform-
ists and conservatives inside and outside the military and massive street violence in Jakar-
ta (known as Semanggi I incident), the first round of this contest ended with an uneasy 
compromise. Law No. 3/1999 on the composition of the MPR, DPR and regional repre-
sentative bodies (DPRDs) retained military representation in legislative bodies, but re-
duced military seats in the DPR from seventy-five to thirty-eight and to 10 percent in the 
local legislatures (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) (Honna 2003:165). The 
MPR’s seats were reduced to 700. It was henceforth composed of the 500 legislators of 
the DPR, 135 functional and sixty-five regional representatives. 
The deliberation of two further bills – Law on Freedom of Expression and Law on State 
Security – were additional legislative battlegrounds in the process of “competitive argu-
mentation” between the legislature and the military. In the first case, the DPR under mas-
sive pressure from civil society substantially revised the government drafted bill that, in its 
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initial form, curtailed the freedom of expression.4 The second bill drafted by the military and 
submitted to the House shortly before DPR resumed session in September 1999, led to 
violent street confrontation between 2,000 students and the military.5 Protestors and ob-
servers feared that the law is nothing more than a legal instrument to silence the demands 
of the reform movement challenging the government in the upcoming MPR session and to 
empower the military to take political control.6 A Special Commission of the DPR met with 
Gen. Wiranto to discuss revision proposals but the latter rejected them. The DPR failed 
this time to exert its legislative capacity in favor of the reform agenda and instead approved 
the law on 23 September 1999 which led to new violent street protests. In the face of una-
bated criticism of the law and the military’s brutality, the government eventually decided to 
delay the ratification of the State Security Law.7 
 
4.3. Transforming Old Structures through “Competitive Argumentation:”  
Legislature-Military Interaction under Democratic Transition (1999-2004) 
After the June 1999 parliamentary elections institutionalization of Indonesia’s new democ-
racy entered a new stage. Between 1999 and 2002, the MPR negotiated four major 
amendments of the country’s 1945 Constitution. The decision to amend the existing consti-
tution instead of writing a new one reflected a societal consensus that the 1945 Constitu-
tion should be retained as a national symbol, but at the same time transforming it into an 
institutional framework which would allow the new democracy to consolidate. In the unfold-
ing “competitive argumentation” over constitutional amendments and legislation defining 
civil-military relations in the post-Suharto era, the DPR became a key actor. We further 
trace the dynamics of “competitive argumentation” within three case studies illustrating 
DPR-TNI interaction: constitutional change, military legislation and legislative supervision.  
Constitutional Change and the Military’s Political Role 
With the momentum on the side of the reformist movement, it was hardly surprising that 
the compromise of Law No. 3 about the military’s representation in legislatures did not last 
long. The issue soon resurfaced in the debate about constitutional amendments where it 
became an object of intense argumentative competition between progressive legislators 
supported by civil society groups and the military. Amid renewed street violence (known as 
Semanggi II incident), covert activities of rogue military elements instigating violence in 
provincial flashpoints such as Aceh, East Java, the Moluccas and Central Kalimantan 
(O’Rourke 2002), and intense behind the scenes wheeling and dealing, the MPR in its 
October 1999 session agreed to withdraw its representatives from the DPR by the end of 
the legislative term in 2004,8 but insisted to retain its seats in the MPR until 2009.  
The military’s bargaining position strengthened markedly when Habibie’s successor, Presi-
dent Abdurrahman Wahid, became increasingly entangled in a power struggle with the 
legislature. In the process, both Wahid as well as the legislature sought the support of the 
military establishment. Wahid, who after coming to power had aligned himself with a re-
formist military faction led by Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, had to backpedal and in a 
tactical move to placate the military supported the rise of a group of highly conservative 
                                                            
4  The Jakarta Post, 30 July 1998 and 21 October 1998. 
5  The Jakarta Post, 26 August 1999, 1 and 18 September 1999. 
6  The Jakarta Post, 22 September 1999. 
7  The Jakarta Post, 25 September 1999. 
8  The Jakarta Post, 26 February 2000. 
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officers to the helm of the military institution, while the DPR sought military backing in its 
moves to impeach President Wahid. In the MPR’s annual session in August 2000, the TNI 
leadership was thus able to reject a quid pro quo which would have ended military pres-
ence in the MPR in exchange of voting rights for soldiers9 and to retain military presence in 
the MPR until 2009. Making things worse, by stipulating that the TNI is responsible to the 
president and not to the minister of defense, the MPR granted a special role to the military 
untypical for consolidated democracies.10 
The TNI justified its position by referring to the instability of the country, an instability to 
which it had itself contributed by attempts to destabilize the Wahid administration through 
covert operations instigating violence in several parts of the country (O’Rourke 2002). The 
securitization of Indonesia’s constitutional debate resonated well especially among nation-
alist parties such as the PDI-P and Golkar.11 It enabled them to vent their frustration over 
Wahid’s repeated Cabinet reshuffles which cut them off from political patronage. Some 
House leaders openly shared the military’s position, obviously motivated by an attempt to 
secure military support for their presidential ambitions in the dawning post-Wahid period 
(Salim 2006:231). Political parties thus sacrificed an early exit of the TNI from the MPR for 
the prospect of an alliance with the conservative mainstream in the armed forces in their 
struggle against the country’s civilian president.  
However, in the face of unabated strong public criticism the issue of TNI representation 
once more climaxed dramatically in the August 2002 MPR session due to the blackmailing 
tactics chosen by the military leadership. TNI chief Endriartono Sutarto’s demand to return 
to the 1945 Constitution (Ziegenhain 2008:157) was a thinly veiled threat to derail the on-
going constitutional amendment process in the very last minute.12 In a tense atmosphere of 
competitive argumentation and amid coup rumors (Schuck 2003:166), the TNI finally gave 
in to reform pressures inside and outside the legislature and the MPR eventually decided 
by majority vote to end TNI representation in the MPR by 2004.13  
Reforming Military Legislation   
Despite a power shift in favor of the military as a result of the conflict between President 
Wahid and the legislature and the rise of conservative officers to the TNI leadership, the 
constitutional debates kept reform pressures on the military alive. Unabated reform pres-
sures led the military to substantially revise its internal reform concept from 1998, renam-
ing it Paradigma Baru, First Phase. While the First Phase considered civil-military relations 
as power sharing under dwifungsi, the Second Phase defined the roles and authority of 
TNI under civilian supremacy (Hafidz 2006: 152-153). This shows that by this time the 
military has adopted a new definition of its political role more in tune with the new demo-
cratic order. Important new points on the military agenda were the implementation of the 
Joint Service Doctrine, the restructuring of the army’s territorial structure (which parallels 
the civilian bureaucracy), the implementation of protection and promotion of human rights 
principles in all military actions, giving up the attitude and mindset as the “guardian of the 
nation” and transformation of the curricula of the Military Academy concerning teaching on 
socio-political issues.14 
                                                            
9  The Jakarta Post, 17 June 2002. 
10  The Jakarta Post, 11 October 2001, 11 February 2004, 24 June 2004, 12 July 2004, 10 January 2007.  
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The fact that the military strongly relied on internal reforms as a means to adjust to the new 
democratic order shows that it was ill prepared to sacrifice much of its autonomy. This 
explains why the “competitive argumentation” between the legislature and civil society, on 
the one hand, and the armed forces, on the other, over military reform legislation took a 
quite acrimonious form. Crucial in this respect was Law No. 3/2002 which, in tandem with 
Law No. 2/2002, determined the roles of the National Police and the Armed Forces after 
their separation in 1999. The second major piece of legislation was the Military Law No. 
34/2004 which regulated internal organization and functions of the military. At stake in 
these laws was the issue of how much civilian and parliamentary control over TNI should 
be built into the legal framework. The TNI instrumentalized the negotiations of two draft 
bills to regain some of the ground it had given up under the auspices of the Paradigma 
Baru. In the end, however, the TNI achieved its objectives only partially. Both laws repre-
sented compromises between the armed forces and the legislature. Crucial for achieving 
these compromises which, on the one hand, retained the special role of the armed forces 
in the country’s political system, but, on the other, also markedly strengthened civilian su-
premacy, was an emerging epistemic community consisting of civilian defense experts, 
who played a moderating role in the negotiations. 
Law No. 3/2002 specified the defense functions of TNI. The law concluded lengthy nego-
tiations which started already during the Habibie presidency. A first bill, drafted by the TNI 
and submitted to the legislature in 1999 (State Security Law, see Case Study 2), had to be 
withdrawn due to vociferous public opposition. The re-drafting of the bill, which began un-
der the Wahid administration, was more participatory and apart from the defense ministry 
and the TNI headquarters also included civilian experts from the academe and civil socie-
ty.15 The DPR eventually succeeded in inserting into the law a clause empowering the 
legislature to endorse the presidential nominee for the post of TNI chief-of-staff. The law 
also specified eligibility for the TNI top post, in an attempt of de-politicizing military promo-
tion procedures. The predominance of the army in the TNI, and by implication, the army’s 
territorial structure, was left untouched by this change. The law also confirmed MPR De-
cree VII/2000 which had vested in the TNI “functions other than war.” This means that the 
TNI still has a role in internal security such as in the suppression of separatism and terror-
ism. The DPR was however able to stipulate that troop deployments for security operations 
must be endorsed by the DPR.  
But the DPR failed to redefine the relationship between TNI headquarters and the Depart-
ment of Defense. While the law stated that “in terms of policy and defense strategy includ-
ing administration support, TNI is under the coordination of the Department of Defense,” it 
did not explain the meaning of “under coordination” and the way the coordination should be 
carried out (Anggoro 2007:14). Neither did it provide a timetable for integration of the TNI 
under the Department of Defense. With the TNI chief participating in cabinet meetings, the 
TNI still wields considerable political influence, even though it had officially withdrawn from 
active politics (ibid.).  
Partly overlapping with Law No. 3/2002, Law No. 34/2004 became the cornerstone of mili-
tary reform legislation. It not only further specified the functions of TNI, but also regulated 
its internal organization. It was drafted by a working group established by the Department 
of Defense consisting of officials from the ministry, representatives of TNI headquarters 
and members of the academe. Negotiations in the drafting group dragged on for more than 
2 years and were characterized by serious disagreements. Complicating the negotiations 
was the fact that, over time, the TNI replaced its drafters by more conservative representa-
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tives who increasingly dominated the drafting process. Much of the draft legislation thus 
reflected the views of the armed forces. 16 
Particular controversy attracted Article 19 which became known as “pasal kudeta” or coup 
article. The article gave the armed forces widespread discretion in handling emergencies 
and internal security problems without notifying the president and the legislature. Existence 
of the article was made public by one civilian member of the drafting group in a press con-
ference.17 Expectedly, the revelation caused a public outcry. Although the article received 
support from leading legislators such as Golkar party chairman Akbar Tandjung and MPR 
chairman Amien Rais, in the end TNI had to yield to the strong public pressure and to 
withdraw the unpopular article.18 
The legislature, with the assistance of civilian defense experts, was thus able to rid the bill 
of the most serious encroachments of the TNI on civilian supremacy. The law placed TNI 
under democratic core norms such as democracy, civilian supremacy, human rights; na-
tional and international law. Troop deployments by the President and the use of force 
henceforth need to be approved by the DPR within 48 hours. The DPR also successfully 
thwarted attempts of the TNI to weaken parliamentary participation in the appointment of 
the TNI chief and to reinstate dwi fungsi through a clause that had proposed that active 
military officers be allowed to occupy civilian posts in the bureaucracy. The law also 
touched upon the hot potato of military businesses and provided for their transfer to the 
state by 2009, but left open how this is to be done (International Crisis Group 2004:9). 
While the TNI failed to restore some of its pre-1998 prerogatives due to public pressure 
and legislative oversight, it succeeded in maintaining the status quo in other crucial areas 
of military reform. Law No. 34/2004, for instance, did not abolish the territorial structure of 
the TNI. Neither did it explicitly place the TNI under the defense ministry. The law also 
retained the “functions other than war.” Although the law clarified this provision by enumer-
ating several military responsibilities such as fighting terrorism, it perpetuated the blurred 
lines of responsibility for internal security. It is thus fair to conclude that the law failed to 
overcome existing ambiguities in civil-military relations, especially in issues where no 
agreement was possible.  
Establishing Legislative Supervision  
Established supervisory procedures are, as argued by Cottey, Edmunds & Foster (2000), a 
critical element in second generation military reforms. Yet, the institutional foundations for 
effective supervision must already be laid during the first generation of reforms. Particularly 
crucial in this respect is supervision of the defense budget. A telling indicator how effective 
the legislature in this respect is military procurement.  
In Indonesia, one of the cherished reserved domains of the armed forces is procurement of 
military equipment. Yet, as even Indonesian Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono admit-
ted, procurement is notoriously corruption-prone. It is dominated by brokers, often former 
or active military officers, who negotiate the kickbacks with the decision-makers, link buy-
ers with contractors and charge a hefty commission for their activities. It is estimated that 
30 percent of the official defense budget is “lost through corruption in the process of buying 
military equipment and supplies” (Beeson 2008:480). 
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Before 2003, the Indonesian parliament was widely inactive in scrutinizing procurement 
deals. Like the Ministry of Defense, it was bypassed by TNI headquarters. Legislators, 
who, with a few exceptions, were largely novices in defense matters, lacked the necessary 
technical expertise to scrutinize purchases of defense equipment and, no less importantly, 
were preoccupied with negotiating constitutional amendments which would curtail the mili-
tary’s role in politics. 
The first major procurement case in which the DPR became involved was the acquisition of 
four Sukhoi fighter jets and two M-35 assault helicopters from Russian arms manufacturer 
Rosoboronexport at a cost of US$192.6 million during a state visit of President Megawati 
Sukarnoputri in Russia in April 2003. The two parties agreed that 20 percent of the costs 
should be paid in cash, the remaining 80 percent through a countertrade mechanism to be 
handled by state logistics agency Bulog. The deal became public after Finance Minister 
Boediono refused to repay Bulog’s US$30 million down payment, arguing that the deal was 
not included in the state budget.19 
Responding to the intra-bureaucratic conflict, Commission I on Foreign Affairs, Defense 
and Information of the DPR set up a working committee of inquiry (Panitia Pekerja) in June 
2003. In its 3-months deliberations, the committee unearthed a number of embarrassing 
facts, but in the end, obviously under pressure from party leaderships, ruled that there 
were no irregularities despite conceding that there have been violations of the purchasing 
procedure.20 It largely followed the explanation of President Megawati Sukarnoputri that the 
deal was essential in the light of infringements on Indonesian territory by foreign powers 
and that the countertrade offered the opportunity to promote Indonesian exports.21 
After the Sukhoi case, the DPR brought up other procurement issues to public scrutiny. 
One of them was the overprized purchase of thirty-two armored personnel carriers for the 
TNI’s participation in the UN Lebanon mission in 2006.22 The DPR can thus be credited 
with having heightened public concern for irregularities in the procurement process. To this 
extent, it has achieved the objective of first generation military reforms of establishing an 
institutional base for legislative supervision. Yet, the various procurement scandals have 
also shown that there are no legal consequences for those involved in irregularities. With 
its obvious lack of consistency and rigor, the DPR is unable to effectively discourage the 
military institution and fraudulent individuals from circumventing, twisting, by-passing and 
even openly defying the legal provisions for procurement. 
The problems of scrutinizing procurement are representative for the legislature’s general 
limitations in budgetary oversight. Yet, such a critical assessment should not ignore that 
there have been marked improvements in defense budgeting over the last 10 years. But 
legislators readily admit that they are overwhelmed by the flood of data and that they often 
lack the technical expertise to screen the items in sufficient depth. They thus concentrate 
on random checks, covering about 20 percent of the budget’s items.23 Still, legislators 
spend most of their time, about 29 percent, on budgetary matters as one study of the Uni-
versitas Indonesia-based think tank Pacivis disclosed (Widjajanto, Kurniawan & Tirtawinata 
2008:17).  
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Even more serious is the failure of the DPR to thoroughly examine the process of budget 
implementation. As several of the interviewed legislators complained, the Ministry of De-
fense and the TNI only reluctantly provide information on actual spending.24 On the spot 
inspection has been repeatedly cited by legislators as a remedy. Yet, on the spot inspec-
tion is hardly able to bring to the fore misallocations of appropriated funds as potential 
offenders may have sufficient time to cover up the irregularities before the legislators ar-
rive. Intermittent audits of the defense budget have indeed revealed serious irregularities25 
in the form of disobeying the rules and regulations (70 percent), uneconomic and inefficient 
use of state finance (20 percent) and ineffectiveness (10 percent).26 But also the State 
Auditing Board (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, BPK) has encountered major obstacles to 
systematically scrutinize TNI spending (International Crisis Group 2001:13; Artjana 
2005:151, 158; Human Rights Watch 2006:92, 99). 
Similarly problematic is the fact that the DPR does not hold the TNI accountable for the 
budgetary implications of covert operations or offensives against separatists such as the 
one started in May 2003 in Aceh. In these cases in which the military argues that the uni-
tary state is at stake, the majority of legislators readily side with the armed forces, giving 
the latter virtual discretion over its operations. Given these shortcomings of budgetary 
oversight, outspoken legislator Djoko Susilo of the Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) conclud-
ed that “in budgeting the DPR is still a rubber stamp.”27  
Summarizing the evolution of legislature-military relations in Indonesia during the first two 
phases of transition, that is, “regime change” and “democratic transition and first genera-
tion military reforms,” two major conclusions can be drawn. First, the legislature definitely 
mattered as a player in military reform after the resignation of President Suharto. The legis-
lature exerted substantial influence on the constitutional amendment process in the MPR, 
passed legislation curtailing military power and wielded oversight functions more assertive-
ly than in the past. Pivotal in this development was DPR’s Commission I (Komisi I) on For-
eign Affairs, Defense and Information which is composed of forty-nine members. At the 
time of field work, Commission I was supported by twenty staffers and had a budget of 
US$ 100,000. It held three meetings a week, all open to the public, except for hearings on 
the secret intelligence budget (Born 2006: 60). It was well linked to think tanks, university 
institutes, civil society organizations and the media. Due to the fact that the membership of 
the Commission fluctuated only moderately during the legislature’s five-year term, it ac-
quired substantial specialist knowledge as a collective body on defense matters. The se-
cond observation is that with the military law (Law No. 34/2004) the scope for further con-
cessions on the part of the military had come to an end. As a result, the process of “com-
petitive argumentation,” which so far enabled progress in military reform, became dead-
locked. 
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4.4. Re-legitimizing Old Grounds through “Constitutive Localization”: Stalemated 
Legislative-Military Interaction under Democratic Consolidation (2004-2009) 
But why and how has the deadlock occurred? Moreover, what are its theoretical implica-
tions for the mode of interaction and practical consequences for future legislature-military 
relations? This process of stagnation will be empirically discussed in the following case 
studies on TNI’s territorial structure, military business as well as human rights impunity and 
military justice. Our findings suggest that a normative and pragmatic convergence occurs 
between parliamentarians and defense epistemic communities, on the one hand, and mili-
tary, on the other hand. This ideational re-orientation caused a narrowing of the scope of 
military reforms. As a matter of course, first generation military reforms remained incom-
plete impairing on second generation reforms – crucial for consolidating de facto parlia-
mentary control - to get off the ground. Moreover, during this process of re-orientation the 
mode of legislature-military interaction had shifted to “constitutive localization.”  
Reforming TNI’s Territorial Structure 
The territorial command structure of the Indonesian army is closely intertwined with the 
historical development of the Indonesian military from a guerrilla force to regular armed 
forces. It reflects the experiences of the independence struggle against the Dutch and is 
part of the army’s Sishankamrata (total people’s defense and security system) doctrine. 
The territorial commands were formed and expanded in the 1950s and 1960s in order to 
deal with separatist movements and the communist infiltrations (Kingsbury 2003; Honna 
2003; Hafidz 2006; Sebastian 2006). During the Suharto era it became an organizational 
structure paralleling the civilian bureaucracy on all levels of the state. Below the armed 
forces headquarters, army commands existed at the regional level (Kodam), provincial 
level (Korem), district level (Kodim), sub-district level (Koramil) and village level (Babinsa). 
The territorial command structure enabled the armed forces to interfere in civilian politics, 
to establish a dense intelligence network and to build up its own business infrastructure. 
Throughout its existence it had been the mainstay of the Indonesian military’s power. This 
explains why in the post-Suharto era dismantling the army’s territorial command structure 
became a core demand of the reform movement. 
Debates within the armed forces about the transformation of the territorial structure ended 
with the rise of conservative military officers to the TNI leadership in 2001. In subsequent 
reshuffles, they sidelined or purged reformist officers led by Maj. Gen. Agus  
Wirahadikusumah and Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo who had earlier proposed a total or partial 
dismantling of the territorial units. The trend against reforming the territorial structure be-
came also visible in the heated parliamentary debates of the TNI Law No. 34/2004 in which 
the lawmakers were only able to strike an ambiguous compromise with the TNI. Despite 
taking a more critical stance than previously against the TNI’s determination to hold on the 
territorial mechanisms,28 lawmakers eventually accepted the maintenance of territorial 
commands. In return, the military had to make sure that its political role was to be fully 
eliminated (Said 2006: 230). Part of the compromise was also provisions in Law No. 
34/2004 for a future review of the army’s territorial structure. Yet, there were no concerted 
moves of the legislature after 2004 to call for an implementation of such a review.29 
Separatist uprisings in various parts of the country and the threats posed by terrorism after 
the October 2002 Bali bombings strengthened TNI’s arguments for retaining the territorial 
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structure. Responding to ethno-religious strife and separatist challenges, TNI increased the 
number of regional commands from ten to twelve between 1999 and 2002. In 1999 it es-
tablished Kodam Pattimura in Ambon and in February 2002 Iskandar Muda regional com-
mand in Aceh (Heiduk 2010: 128, The Editors 2003:28-29). Kodam Iskandar Muda be-
came the operational base for the TNI when in May 2003 it launched the largest military 
offensive in the history of Indonesia against the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) rebels. In 
October 2005 President Yudhoyono proposed to strengthen the territorial structure as a 
means to fight terrorism more effectively, a suggestion received favorably by the TNI.30 
This strategy has not changed since then. Quite to the contrary, it has become even more 
entrenched as illustrated by the reactions of lawmakers, military and the executive to the 
Jakarta hotel bombings in July 2009. 31 Leading lawmakers from Commission I supported 
the strengthening of the TNI in the anti-terrorism activities. However, while emphasizing 
the necessity to rely upon the competence and skills of the TNI in fighting terrorism, they 
also advised that this widening of the military’s mission should be clearly regulated by the 
government and closely overseen by the public and the legislature in order to prevent hu-
man rights abuses as occurred in the past.32 However, these precautions cannot obscure 
the fact that since passing the military law No. 34/2004, the DPR has abstained from mak-
ing new overtures towards dismantling the territorial structure. In fact, the issue is dead-
locked since then. 
The Futile Effort of Reforming the Indonesian Military Businesses 
The power and autonomy of the Indonesian armed forces is also closely intertwined with 
their economic activities. A military business sector emerged when the armed forces took 
over the Dutch companies nationalized in 1957 and the expropriated British and American 
firms in 1964 and 1965 (Robison 1986). In the early 1960s the army also began to estab-
lish non-profit foundations (yayasan), the number of which increased rapidly in the New 
Order period. By the end of the Suharto regime, a far-flung empire of military businesses 
existed that can be subdivided into (1) formal businesses, (2) informal business activities 
and (3) illicit businesses. Formal military businesses are usually under the holding of a 
foundation or a cooperative. They cover a wide range of commercial activities including 
interests in hotels, taxi firms, shipping, airlines, timber, plantation, insurance, property, 
banks and construction companies (Human Rights Watch 2006).33 Informal businesses are 
not controlled by the military as an institution but by individual officers and their families. 
Often military officers are only members of the board of private businesses without an 
active role in their operations. Most problematic are undoubtedly the illicit business practic-
es of the military. They include protection rackets for gambling dens, prostitution rings and 
business companies ranging from the Chinese shop keeper to transnational corporations 
such as ExxonMobile and Freeport Mining, drug courier services, smuggling of goods, 
illegal logging, human trafficking, renting out of military equipment to private firms, selling 
fuel and spare parts, selling commodities from military cooperatives to local communities 
and selling weapons especially in conflict and post-conflict areas (Rabasa & Haseman 
2002:76; Human Rights Watch 2006). 
The military has always been adamant in defending its business interests. It justified its 
economic activities with the argument that – until recently – only 25-30 percent of the TNI’s 
budgetary needs were covered by the state budget and that the enterprises in the first 
place serve the welfare of the ordinary soldier. However, comprehensive studies of the 
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military business sector (Human Rights Watch 2006; Rieffel & Pramowardhani 2006; 
Mietzner 2008) have exposed this reasoning as a myth. New estimates suggest that be-
tween 50 and 60 percent of the defense budget are currently covered by the government’s 
defense budget which has more than quadrupled since 2000. 
The DPR saw a chance to regulate the military businesses in the negotiation process of 
Law No. 34/2004. A group of progressive Komisi I legislators eventually succeeded in in-
cluding an article in the law (e.g. Article 76) which stipulates that all military businesses 
must be transferred to the government within a period of 5 years. Some legislators also 
repeatedly demanded that regular audits of the military enterprises are conducted.34 Unfor-
tunately, though, Law No. 34/2004 says nothing about the military’s informal and illegal 
business practices. 
While the DPR was able to pave the way for a wholesale reform of military businesses, TNI 
succeeded in slowing down and diluting the reform. The task force set up to work out the 
details for the transfer, the Supervisory Team for the Transformation of TNI Businesses 
(TSTB), was a body on which the Ministry of Defense had strong influence and subse-
quently failed in devising credible criteria defining what constitutes a military business. The 
inventory of military businesses thus proved a highly confusing exercise, with the number 
of business units first fixed at 219 and later revised to 1,520 and finally to 2,636 (Mietzner 
2006:55; Mietzner 2008:233).35 Most of these units were foundations and cooperatives, 
which the military excluded from the transfer on the ground that they served the welfare of 
the soldiers. In the end, the military only defined six enterprises with assets over 
US$50,000 as transferable businesses (Honna 2009:242).36 By that time it had already 
sold its shares in profitable companies such as the Artha Graha Bank and Kostrad’s Man-
dala airline to the private sector (Mietzner 2006:56). While these practices were strongly 
criticized in the legislature,37 there was little legislators could do as also the president sided 
with the TNI.38 Moreover, he returned several times the draft submitted by TSTB for a pres-
idential decree regulating the details of the transfer of the military businesses to the gov-
ernment. When the legislature’s term ended in October 2009, the deadline set by Law No 
34/2004 had expired. By that time, the issue had also disappeared from the legislature’s 
agenda. The legislators had acquiesced to the strategy of TNI of diluting and postponing 
the issue. The new legislature elected in April 2009 had, at the time of writing, failed to 
table the topic anew.39  The issue of military businesses has thus remained unresolved. For 
the foreseeable future a major pillar of military autonomy will thus remain intact. 
TNI’s Human Rights Impunity and Military Justice in Limbo  
The worst authoritarian legacy of the Indonesian armed forces is their human rights record. 
The Indonesian military was involved in the large-scale violence which erupted in the af-
termath of the aborted coup of 30 September 1965, which was blamed by the military on 
the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). In the subsequent witch hunt on Communists 
between 500,000 and one million people died. Military operations against Muslim sectari-
ans such as in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta (1984), and Talangsari, South Sumatra (1989) and 
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the separatist movements in East Timor, Aceh and Papua also led to serious human rights 
abuses. Moreover, military units were responsible for the kidnapping of dissidents shortly 
before the collapse of the Suharto regime, the shooting of demonstrating students at Tri-
sakti University, the riots in May 1998 and the Semanggi I and II incidents during the 
Habibie presidency (O’Rourke 2002; Ufen 2002; Schuck 2003). Severe human rights 
abuses of military personnel were also a concomitant of the independence referendum in 
East Timor (August and September 1999), the communal conflicts in Maluku (1999-2002) 
and Central Sulawesi and the offensives against the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) sepa-
ratists in Aceh. It is thus hardly surprising that human rights activists and parts of the 
reformasi movement demanded that the officers responsible for the abuses are brought to 
justice. In their view, ending military impunity and the culture of violence pervading the 
institution should be one of the most significant elements of military reform. 
The legislature’s achievements in creating a credible post-authoritarian human rights re-
gime were ambiguous. The DPR ratified major international human rights conventions 
which the government had signed after the fall of Suharto. The legislature also markedly 
contributed to the constitutional amendments of Article 28 which was expanded to become 
a Bill of Rights (Eldridge 2002). Yet, in the intense post-Suharto “competitive argumenta-
tion” over human rights legislation lawmakers in the MPR could not prevent the insertion of 
a clause in the constitution prohibiting the retroactive prosecution of human rights abuses. 
Responding to strong international pressures demanding prosecution of the military’s post-
referendum abuses in East Timor, the legislature subsequently sought to define conditions 
which despite the retroactivity clause would allow holding past human rights violators ac-
countable. Therefore, Human Right Law No. 26/2000 stipulated that human rights viola-
tions committed before the enactment of the law will fall under the jurisdiction of ad hoc 
courts, while those taking place after this law came into force will be prosecuted by special 
human rights courts. The human rights courts only have jurisdiction over gross violations of 
human rights such as genocide or crimes against humanity including those committed by 
Indonesian citizens outside Indonesia. Moreover, according to the decision of the Constitu-
tional Court No. 18/PUU-V/2007 the recourse to the ad hoc courts’ prosecution of cases of 
human rights violations has to be made upon recommendation of the National Commission 
on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) and the Attorney General. Ad hoc human rights courts, 
however, can only be set up by a presidential decree following a recommendation of the 
DPR (Hadiprayitno 2009).  
So far, under immense public pressure, the DPR has endorsed the establishment of ad-
hoc tribunals for human rights violations in East Timor in the Suharto era and the 1984 
Tanjung Priok massacre, which acquitted most officers and generals involved (Hafidz 
2006: 201-202). The conduct of the trials and the process of investigation appeared to be 
highly politicized which partly explains the poor performance of the judiciary to deliver cred-
ible sentences. In the Tanjung Priok case (September 2003 to August 2004), most defend-
ants who were low and middle ranking officers were released, while only two of them were 
sentenced. Prominent figures such as Gen. Try Sutrisno and Gen. L.B. Murdani were not 
defendants in the trial. Moreover, an atmosphere of intimidation by the TNI surrounded the 
work of these Human Rights courts when military troops and officers associated with 
Kopassus (Special Forces) were mobilized to attend the court proceedings (Hadiprayitno 
2009).40 In other human rights issues such as the Talangsari incident the DPR did not 
recommend to the president issuing a presidential decree for the establishment of an ad-
hoc tribunal as required by Human Rights Law No. 26/2000.41 
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The revision of the Military Tribunal Law No. 31/ 1977 is one of the few legislative initia-
tives targeting the military reform originating in the House. It seeks to place the investiga-
tion and prosecution of military crimes involving civilians under civilian judicial control  
(Heiduk 2009:16). The revision of the law started in 2003 but it did not yield any result. 
When the new parliament elected in 2004 re-opened the process of negotiation on the 
revision of the military tribunal law, lawmakers tried first to find a minimum consensus 
about why the revision is needed and how to proceed with it.  
The breakthrough eventually came after media and civil society were heavily involved by 
the lawmakers as part of a shaming strategy that targeted Defense Minister Juwono who 
was openly accused of thwarting the reform process. The Department of Defense and TNI 
eventually agreed on the revision of Article 9 of the law that would render possible to refer 
soldiers committing crimes to the civilian justice system. Still, however, legislature-military 
negotiations over the draft bill ended in deadlock over the question of who should be in 
charge of investigating the crimes. Up to the end of the legislative term in October 2009, 
TNI stubbornly rejected the police as investigating agency on the ground that police is 
corrupt and that in the face of the fierce rivalry between the police and the military after the 
separation of the two institutions in 1999, soldiers could not be expected to be treated 
fairly. Interestingly, a number of political parties in the DPR such as Golkar, the Democratic 
Party, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the Prosperous Peace Party (PDS) and Demo-
cratic Vanguard Star (PPD) supported TNI’s position on the issue of investigation.42 The 
DPR finally abandoned the deliberations on the military tribunal law before the old House 
came to end its mandate.43  At the time of writing, the more conservative House elected in 
April 2009 has done nothing to revive the negotiations on the military tribunal law, suggest-
ing that it is even closer than the previous legislature to the norms cherished by the mili-
tary. 
Explaining the Deadlock: From “Competitive Argumentation” to “Constitutive  
Localization” 
The case studies on the army’s territorial structure, military businesses and military justice 
have amply illustrated that after the enactment of the military law No. 34/2004, interactions 
between the legislature armed forces became deadlocked. Key elements of first generation 
military reforms remained incomplete and the legislature was not able to establish a de-
gree of firmly institutionalized oversight that is characteristic for second generation reforms. 
Except for the Freedom of Information Bill of 2008, which liberalized access to information 
in the realm of defense and security, the DPR did not pass any new legislation spurring 
military reform. Quite to the contrary, in an attempt to contain the consequences of the 
Freedom of Information Law, the government with the support of the security agencies, 
launched a State Secrecy Bill that, if passed by the legislature, would neutralize many of 
the gains of the Freedom of Information Law. And also the bill on civil reserves deliberated 
in the legislature elected in 2009 includes provisions strengthening the autonomy of the 
military in defense and security matters.44 All in all, one may conclude that after 2004 the 
DPR continued to screen executive bills, expose irregularities in the field of procurement, 
exert oversight of the defense budget and subjected the designated TNI chiefs to fit-and-
proper tests, but that these activities had a diminishing impact on the TNI. Detrimental to 
DPR oversight capacities is also the high turnover rate of legislators in the electoral pro-
cess. After each parliamentary election around 70 percent of the legislators were not re-
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turned to the House (Sherlock 2004).45 In Commission I, there are currently only five legis-
lators who had served in the previous legislature, a dramatic loss of expertise which cannot 
be compensated on short notice. 
Further contributing to the deadlock was the fact that the new democracy had difficulties to 
consolidate. The process of transition did not come to an end before finally the MPR had 
concluded the constitutional amendment process in 2002. Until then, the new democracy 
faced great problems to deliver what was expected of it. Economic recovery from the Asian 
financial crisis was sluggish, corruption (including the legislature) was endemic as ever 
and, perhaps worst in the view of most Indonesians, separatist insurgencies and ethno-
religious strife in several parts of the country jeopardized the territorial integrity of the Indo-
nesian state. The slow pace of consolidation and the power struggles within the civilian 
elite during the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid gave the military the chance to regroup 
and strengthen its bargaining position in the process of “competitive argumentation” with 
the legislature and the reform movement.  
Also external factors strengthened the domestic position of the armed forces. After the 
terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 and the declaration of South-
east Asia a “Second Front” in the war against terrorism, the Bush administration began to 
court the TNI as an ally. This policy sought to revert the ban imposed on military coopera-
tion between the U.S. and Indonesia which the U.S. government imposed on Indonesia 
under the Leahy Law of 2000 in response to the Indonesian military’s human rights viola-
tions in East Timor (Fromm 2010). With the military law No. 34/2004, the military had 
reached institutional arrangements which secured much of its internal autonomy. They 
accorded to it a position weaker than under authoritarian rule, but markedly stronger than 
in established liberal democracies. The scope for further compromises in a process of 
“competitive argumentation” had been exhausted. 
Yet, the relationship between the DPR and the military did not relapse into “competitive 
argumentation” or “pseudo-competitive argumentation” as theoretical assumptions on “rhe-
torical action” let us expect (Schimmelfennig 2003). What, in fact, happened was the con-
vergence of legislators and the military on a new normative consensus which amalgamat-
ed new and old political ideas. The common new ideational platform localizing the democ-
racy norm was nationalism. Given the ordeals of the independence struggle, repeated 
serious separatist challenges in the nation’s post-independence history and a seemingly 
hostile international environment, nationalism is the norm most deeply ingrained in the 
Indonesian collective memory (Weinstein 1976).  
Nationalism experienced a strong resurgence in the post-2004 period. This resurgence 
had two major, albeit contradictory sources. One were the humiliations Indonesia encoun-
tered in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, the conditionalities of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue packages, the intervention of a United Nations peace keeping 
mission in East Timor and the loss of leadership in the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). The other was the pride in having mastered the crisis, against all the 
odds, the economic recovery from 2004 onward, the progressive consolidation of the new 
democracy, and the international recognition Indonesia received for its political transition. 
As a result, pressure on the TNI relaxed. Indonesia’s widely celebrated new image as the 
world’s third largest democracy had a diminishing effect on public watchfulness at home. 
By 2004 the reform movement no longer staged street demonstrations for military reform 
and also the pressure by the media and civil society organizations, though not ending, 
decreased significantly. In fact, opinion polls at the time began to show a remarkable im-
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provement of military ratings (Mietzner 2006: 30). Today, the reform movement mainly 
concentrates on human rights violations, thus reducing military reform to a one-issue af-
fair.46 With Indonesia’s growing democratic image, also the flow of resources for security 
sector reform was drying out. International funding agencies shifted their attention to new 
issues making it more difficult for the local epistemic defense community to sustain their 
activities. Partly propagated by scholars associated with new think tanks, the view gained 
currency that military reform in Indonesia is essentially completed47 and that from now on 
the main task of the military is to professionalize its operational capability by modernizing 
its equipment in line with the needs of modern warfare (Rahakundini Bakrie 2009). Such 
views have been corroborated by encroachments on Indonesia’s natural resources and 
maritime zones by neighbors. Especially the conflict with Malaysia over the Ambalat Block 
in the Sulawesi Sea, a maritime region believed to be rich in oil and gas deposits, has 
aroused strong nationalist outbursts in the Indonesian media, the legislature and the public 
which in some cases reminded of the konfrontasi period in the mid-1960s. Even serious 
political magazines such as Tempo discussed the likelihood of a war with Malaysia and 
compared the military power of the two nations.48 Nationalist groupings sprang up nation-
wide, mobilizing volunteers for the seemingly coming war with Malaysia and legislators 
joined the chorus of these organizations calling to “Crush Malaysia” (Gayang Malaysia).49 
Even less rhetorically radical legislators including those from the pro-Islamic PKS, while 
calling for restraint and diplomatic solutions, opted for military solutions in case Malaysia 
continues to what they regarded as violations of Indonesian sovereignty.50 The conflict with 
Malaysia had several other facets including the putative discrimination of Indonesian labor 
migrants and a dispute over cultural infringements; in sum they exacerbated a widespread 
feeling in Indonesian society that internationally “the country punches below its weight.”51 
This sense of frustrated entitlement, which called for a regional leadership role and a more 
assertive foreign policy in global issues, was another factor driving Indonesia’s neo-
nationalist discourse. 
The resurgence of nationalism strongly favored the military which has always claimed for 
itself to be the vanguard of Indonesian nationalism. The persistent electoral gain of nation-
alist parties was further affirming the new normative consensus based on nationalism 
(Rüland 2009). Legislators and the armed forces converged on the belief that a strong 
military is essential to enable Indonesia to repel encroachments on its sovereignty and to 
play an elevated role in international politics. The persistent increases of the defense 
budget enacted by the DPR may have served to reduce the military’s dependency on ex-
tra-budgetary funding, but they have also to be seen in the context of Indonesia’s external 
challenges and leadership claims in international politics. 
So far, the nationalist discourse did not jeopardize the post-Suharto democratic consen-
sus. But it localized Indonesian democracy by dissociating it from liberal interpretations 
and bringing it back to the organicist traditions of Indonesia’s cognitive prior. Nationalism 
revalued the TNI as a major institution in the Indonesian polity and, at the same time, dis-
credited calls for military reform as a deliberate and, hence, anti-patriotic policy of weaken-
ing the nation’s military force. With the new ideational platform on which legislators and the 
military establishment converged, further breakthroughs in terms of military reform are 
rather unlikely in the nearer future. 
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5.  The Legislature and Military Reform in Nigeria 
Analysis of legislature-military interactions in Nigeria follows the same sequential pattern 
as in the Indonesian case. We distinguish three phases of legislature-military interactions, 
starting with the period of regime change, followed by the institutionalization of the new 
democracy and finally the attempts to consolidate the new political order. For each of these 
phases, we have selected key issues of legislature-military interaction impacting on military 
reform which we present in the form of case studies. To get a better understanding of the 
normative obstacles military reform faces in Nigeria, we begin with briefly examining Nige-
ria’s “cognitive prior,” that is, the normative order prevailing prior to regime change. 
 
5.1. The Nigerian “Cognitive Prior” 
Like in the empires and kingdoms of pre-colonial Java, the separation of the military from 
politics is widely regarded as an alien and predominantly European idea imported to Nige-
ria after independence (Elaigwu 2011). Students of Nigerian history and politics have re-
peatedly argued that soldiers were always closely entangled in the politics of pre-colonial 
Nigerian kingdoms (Mazrui 1975; Uzoigwe 1977). In fact, it was basically military force 
which in pre-colonial times paved the way to power and which preserved power. In Nigeria, 
as in most other pre-colonial, traditional African societies, the average man was a potential 
warrior (Elaigwu 2011). Being a warrior commanded high social prestige. The ideal king 
was thus a great warrior. Lack of military power, on the other hand, was equated with the 
demise of a ruler and, by implication, his kingdom (Uzoigwe 1977). 
The fusion of military and state structure in pre-colonial African kingdoms provided a simi-
larly convenient legitimization for Nigerian military rulers and political soldiers than for the 
Indonesian armed forces. However, despite these constructions of pre-colonial legacies, 
military influence in Nigerian society was less deeply entrenched than in Indonesia. When 
Nigeria became independent in 1960, it did not have to fight for it. Thus, unlike the Indone-
sian armed forces, the Nigerian military could not claim that it was the creator of the nation 
and carve out for itself a political mission based on a particular ideology. Yet, the seces-
sion of the eastern parts of the country in 1967 and the subsequent Biafra War (1967-
1970) provided the Nigerian military with the opportunity to proclaim for itself the role of the 
savior of the nation. In the war, the Nigerian army received a national character and galva-
nized into a de facto national army. Subsequently, the victory over the secessionists and 
the self-image derived from vintage modernization theory, that is, being the organization 
spearheading the drive for modernization, were at the root of an over-boarding claim to 
rule – or at least to have a major influence on policymaking – and a feeling of superiority 
over civilians. The latter was exacerbated by the short-lived interludes of civilian rule and 
the far from persuasive governmental performance of these civilian governments which 
were marred by ethnic strife, rampant corruption and economic decline. Many military of-
ficers thus despise civilians as best exemplified by the often used depreciatory characteri-
zation as “bloody civilians.”52 As the self-styled guardians of the nation’s security the mili-
tary and the professional managers of defense matters, the Nigerian military surrounded all 
defense-related issues with a cloak of secrecy. Removed from public scrutiny and immun-
izing themselves from the probes even of legitimate state organs, enabled the Nigerian 
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armed forces to establish a degree of corporate autonomy that may have been even larger 
than the one the Indonesian military was ever able to carve out for itself. 
 
5.2. Absence of Contestation: Intra-Military Regime Change without Legislature 
(1998-1999) 
Political transition in Nigeria was triggered by the unexpected death of military dictator 
Gen. Abacha on 8 June 1998. As there was no legislature under military rule and civil so-
ciety was muzzled by the brutality of Abacha’s security forces, there was little space for 
“communicative action.” The decision to hand over government to civilians was thus unilat-
erally taken by influential military leaders in consultation with former military heads of state 
following a 16-hours stormy deliberation inside the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC), the 
highest decision body through which the military under Gen. Abacha ruled Nigeria. The 
PRC members opted for two stars General Abdulsalami Abubakar instead of more senior 
officers, such as Lt. Gen. Jeremiah Timbut Useni or Lt. Gen. Bamaiyi, as interim head of 
state.53 The choice of Abubakar signaled a move away from the Abacha’s loyalist group, 
although his appointment was not accepted by all PRC members.54 It appears that his very 
choice hints at an intra-military decision to hand over political power to civilians. Gen.  
Abubakar subsequently enforced May 29, 1999 as the deadline for an early power transfer 
in spite of tough intra-military pressures for delaying the process to October 1999 or even 
to the year 2000.55 
Military elites had come to the conclusion that military rule had been deeply discredited by 
endemic human rights violations, momentous economic incompetence and rampant cor-
ruption, thereby accelerating the decay of the country that was noticeable already under 
previous military governments (Ihonvhere & Shaw 1998). Moreover, the Western world 
made political liberalization a precondition for Nigeria to access external economic and 
financial assistance so much needed. The transition was thus a self-interested decision of 
the military leaders, a tactical retreat motivated by the hope of being able to control the 
damage caused by many years of unbridled military rule and it was not the result of engag-
ing in “communicative action” with any other political actor. In the absence of a public de-
bate about the political future of the country, the military was able to embark on a unilateral 
strategy of change in which it rhetorically accepted democratization, but limited its actions 
on mainly mimicking (Western) democratic institutions and concomitant military reforms 
without changing its identity and normative foundations. The substantial rhetoric-action gap 
illustrated by the subsequent case studies is typical for this isomorphic behavior. The case 
studies also suggest that the feeble legislature emerging after the end of military rule in 
1999 did little to challenge this attitude and largely also engaged in isomorphic behavior. 
Abubakar’s 10-months Transitional Program 
From a comparative perspective, the transitional period under Gen Abubakar corresponds 
to the period of regime restructuring in Indonesia under the presidency of Habibie. A range 
of political measures initiated by Gen. Abubakar in the months following the death of Gen. 
Abacha considerably relaxed the political atmosphere and prepared the reform of the polit-
ical system. Abubakar’s transitional regime thus differed markedly from earlier transition 
programs announced by military rulers which, however, had the only function to create a 
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political order which would perpetuate their autocratic rule. The last such façade transition-
al program was announced by Gen. Abacha in 1995 which most observers believe pur-
sued the objective of legitimizing his presidency through an election (Jega 2007). 
Soon after taking over the interim government, Abubakar scrapped Abacha’s earlier transi-
tion program. This decision was taken in the light of calls coming from the re-emerging, 
however after years of repression still feeble Nigerian civil society, but to an even greater 
extent as a result of external pressures. Tony Lloyd, for instance, the British deputy minis-
ter for African affairs, who met Gen. Abubakar shortly after his appointment on 27 June 
1998, conveyed to him the message that EU sanctions would be eased only if political 
changes take place.56 Similar diplomatic messages came from the U.S. too. 
The Abubakar government subsequently released political prisoners (though not all) and 
enacted a new constitution paving the way to parliamentary and presidential elections in 
February 1999. With some revisions made by the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC), the 
new constitution was largely based on the 1979 Constitution, the charter in force during the 
democratic interlude under President Shehu Shagari (1979-1983). Even though the Consti-
tutional Committee under the leadership of Justice Tobi organized country-wide consulta-
tions, the drafting process was often criticized as controlled by the ruling junta. The mem-
bers of the Tobi Committee were handpicked and the junta also had the final decision on 
the provisions of the document. Finally, shortly before leaving office, Abubakar also re-
pealed the repressive State Security Decree No. 2/198457 on the ground that it violates the 
1999 constitutional provisions.58 
All in all, one may conclude that the domestic pressures for democratization were much 
weaker in Nigeria than in Indonesia. There was no civil society driven reform movement 
staging demonstration on an almost daily basis. This also explains why under the  
Abubakar interim government the military did not embark on a unilateral internal reform 
program like the Indonesian armed forces with the Paradigma Baru. Gen. Abubakar’s ap-
proach towards his own organization was a mixed strategy of appeasement and strategic 
action in favor of the military’s retreat from politics. Soon after his installment, Abubakar 
dissolved the federal cabinet and appointed his own staff.59 In order to secure the support 
of the armed forces for his transitional program, he toured military barracks, explaining why 
it is “imperative for the military to go back to its constitutional role of defending the territorial 
integrity of the country.”60 Part of his strategy to win the support of the armed forces for the 
civilian turnover was to ensure that the salaries of soldiers and officers were increased 
(Olonisakin 1999: 32). Gen. Abubakar had also set up a committee on the “Reorientation 
of the Armed Forces and the Police towards Enduring Democracy,” which organized work-
shops in Abuja and the six geo-political zones of the federation61 on issues pertaining to 
the welfare and adequate remuneration of the military, re-professionalization and the need 
for the armed forces to commit themselves to the democratic transition.62 
The military’s response to international pressures and the country’s accelerating decay 
was thus basically isomorphic behavior. The interim government under Gen. Abubakar and 
the military paid lip service to democratic reforms and engineered the withdrawal of the 
armed forces from politics. But it made sure that the armed forces remained in firm control 
over the democratization process and that military reform would be hardly more than a 
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token of reform. The Nigerian democratic transition thus exhibits the rhetoric-action gap 
characteristic for isomorphic behavior. 
 
5.3. Absence of Legislature-Military Interaction under Democratic Transition  
(1999-2000) 
As previously discussed, the drive towards power transfer to a civilian government did 
neither lead to internal military reforms nor to legislature-military debates over the need to 
reform the Nigerian armed forces. The discourse on military reform during the regime 
change was restricted to the issue of the military’s return to the barracks and re-
professionalization. Nevertheless, no concept of reform or policy agenda was worked out 
and the public itself did not initiate any debates about this. Moreover, the momentum for 
internal military reforms got lost right after the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) under 
Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar handed over power to newly elected President Obasanjo. 
Some moves resembling a weak attempt to first generation military reforms were carried 
out by the executive. The following case study will discuss the extent of military reform as 
enforced by the new executive of President Obasanjo.  
Military Reform under Executive Dominance 
Contrary to the Indonesian legislature, the newly elected bi-cameral Nigerian National 
Assembly (consisting of a House of Representatives and a Senate) was only marginally 
involved in first generation military reforms. Most of the Nigerian reforms were initiated by 
the executive. Shortly after assuming office, President Obasanjo in a surprise move retired 
ninety-three high-ranking military officers.63 All of them were considered “political officers” 
who had served the preceding military dictatorships as ministers, governors and military 
administrators.64 The purge was a first head-on attempt to depoliticize and re-
professionalize the armed forces. Ignoring the preferences of the incumbent service chiefs, 
Obasanjo also appointed a new military leadership. Unlike in the past, the majority of these 
officers did not come from the Hausa-Fulani dominated North, but belonged to minority 
ethnicities of the middle belt. With this choice, Obasanjo sought to pre-empt the instrumen-
talization of the military as a vehicle for the opposition of frustrated Northerners who re-
garded the election of a Yoruba-president from the Southwest as a threat to their traditional 
political hegemony. Obasanjo’s defense minister Theofilo Danjuma, a former general, 
sought to civilianize the Defense Ministry by appointing civilian officials to top positions and 
proposed to reduce the force strength from an estimated 80,000 to 50,000, a plan from 
which he however had to retract due to strong resistance from the armed forces 
(Adejumobi 2000:32). Obasanjo also set up a Human Rights Investigation and Violation 
Commission in June 1999. The Commission, headed by Justice Chukwudifu Oputa and 
henceforth known as Oputa Panel, was tasked with investigating “the causes, nature and 
extent of all gross violations of human rights in Nigeria between January 15, 1966 and May 
28, 1999.”65 Although the Panel gained much recognition for its tireless work in the 3 years 
of its existence, under strong political pressure by former military rulers, the Obasanjo 
government finally decided to lay to rest the Panel’s findings, neither publishing them nor 
acting on them.66 
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Another step to promote military reform was the government’s hiring of Military Profession-
al Resources Incorporated (MPRI), an American consultancy firm for military affairs (Inter-
national Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2000:184). MPRI was tasked to 
devise a plan to civilianize the Nigerian military, to provide technical assistance, to conduct 
workshops on civil-military relations for military officers and civilians and to train Nigerian 
soldiers for peace keeping missions (Fayemi 2005:329; Garba 2008:186). Like in the re-
form measures mentioned above, parliament was neither involved in the decision of con-
tracting MPRI nor in monitoring its activities (Fayemi 2002:17). The latter’s mission, which 
was co-sponsored by USAID and the U.S. Defense Department, was highly controversial 
and opposition to it led to the early retirement of Army Chief Gen. Victor Malu (Yoroms 
2005:179; Fayemi & Olonisakin 2008:262). In fact, it seemed that the decision to hire MPRI 
was largely a symbolic exercise, targeted at the audience abroad without much impact on 
military transformation. 
The whole language of military reform and democratization represented a largely non-
reflected and instrumental adoption of a foreign (Western) discourse on security sector 
reform67 and democratic norms. Interestingly, the drivers of the reform rhetoric were retired 
and partly also active military officers who, in a strategic move instrumentally followed 
some of these new ideational prescriptions. Yet, it was a highly selective and superficial 
implementation of the Western discourse on military reform that could not lead to genuine 
internalization by the military. The pro-reform military elite skillfully evaded any public ar-
gumentative dynamics by successfully framing the issue of military reform as accom-
plished through the retreat from active politics and by omitting to bring up the issue of par-
liamentary control of the armed forces. The concept of military reform on which Obasanjo’s 
moves against the Nigerian armed forces built was purely defined as executive control 
reminding of Huntington’s concept of subjective control (Huntington 1957). Obasanjo’s own 
apprehension and disregard of the Nigerian National Assembly was a good reason for not 
encouraging any debate on parliamentary control and oversight of the Nigerian military.  
Moreover, by borrowing the Western language of reform, the executive could effectively 
prevent any substantial involvement of Western agencies and norm entrepreneurs in this 
field that could have impacted on ideational dynamics inside Nigeria. This contrasts to the 
Indonesian case in which foreign norm entrepreneurs were much more present and in a 
position to influence internal discourses on military reform and the legislature’s role within 
it. In Nigeria the development of an epistemic defense community has been prevented by 
the tight grip over such expert and scholarly networks exerted by a limited number of mili-
tary academic institutions (such as the National Defense College, the Military Academy in 
Kaduna and the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies in Kuru) which have fully 
controlled the discursive production of knowledge on the military in Nigeria until today. In 
addition, a culture of secrecy surrounding all military matters had been perpetuated by all 
stakeholders – executive, legislature and military – and, as it will be shown in the following 
case studies, was unsuccessfully challenged by civil society and scholars.  
 
5.4. ”Entrapped” Legislature in Military-Executive Relations under Democratic  
Consolidation: A Case of “Isomorphic Behavior” (2000-2009) 
The fact that in Nigeria military reform was considered as essentially completed less than 2 
years after regime change, raised major questions for the role of the legislature in civil-
military relations. As the reforms discussed above were mainly of a mimetic nature and a 
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formality, directed to the audience abroad, there was still much scope for the legislature to 
show “actorness” in military reform after first parliamentary elections were held and the 
Nigerian Congress came into existence in 1999. Especially in a presidential system of 
government with its sizeable legislative autonomy, the legislature can shape military reform 
in several ways. First, it can initiate a constitutional review process with the objective of 
strengthening civilian supremacy and democratic control of the armed forces; second, it 
can pass legislation advancing military reform and it can, third, build up supervisory capaci-
ties making it difficult for the military to insulate its reserved domains. 
Yet, the contextual conditions for such actions of the legislature were less favorable in 
Nigeria than in Indonesia. Apart from the fact that major decisions about the re-
civilianization of the military were made prior to the formation of a legislature, there was no 
civil society which would have agitated with the same fervor for the political emasculation 
of the armed forces as in Indonesia. Moreover, as far as it existed, civil society pressure for 
military reforms also subsided much earlier than in Indonesia, irrespective of the fact that 
many intellectuals, the media and civil society continue to harbor strong distrust towards 
the military. Moreover, like in Indonesia after 2004, lawmakers by and large shared the 
ideas of the military on national security in which the armed forces used to frame their 
reservations for a continuation and deepening of the reform process. In Nigeria, too, na-
tionalism became the ideational bridge on which the norms of military leaders and law-
makers converged and which prevented them from competing over institutional arrange-
ments related to military reform. In the subsequent case studies, we will provide empirical 
evidence for these claims by examining the legislature’s role in reviewing the 1999 Consti-
tution, in debating and passing new military legislation and in overseeing the defense sec-
tor.  
Evading the Military: Constitutional Debates and the Legislature 
As outlined above, the legislature had no role in constitutional change in Nigeria after the 
demise of the Abacha regime. In the absence of a legislature and a democratically man-
dated government, constitutional change was a process entirely in the hands of the mili-
tary. Yet, even though the legislature may have been excluded from changing the political 
rules of the game prior to the transition, this does not automatically preclude the possibility 
of amending the constitution after regime change. This is what happened in Nigeria where 
the legislature indeed initiated repeated moves to amend a constitution which for many 
Nigerian democrats still had the odium of the authoritarian past (Nwanko 2003:95). Yet, 
these constitutional debates did only marginally touch upon civil-military relations.  
Initiatives to reform the 1999 Constitution surfaced almost immediately after regime 
change. Much of the pressure for constitutional change came from the re-emerging civil 
society organizations which regarded the constitution as a remnant of the authoritarian 
past and a document undemocratically imposed on the Nigerian people. In the process, 
President Obasanjo appointed an expert commission under Clement Ebri, a former Gover-
nor of River State, to study amendments of the 1999 Constitution (Abia 2008:172), fol-
lowed by the Nigerian National Assembly which established a bicameral review committee 
in 2001. However, civil society organizations seeking a more inclusive and participatory 
constitutional amendment process in the form of a Sovereign National Conference (SNC) 
strongly resented the prospect of the legislature with its seemingly vested interests spear-
heading the revision of the constitution.68 Due to an intensifying dispute between the 
House of Representatives and the presidency over budgetary powers which soon escalat-
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ed into a personal power struggle between President Obasanjo and House Speaker Ghali 
Na’Abbas, the constitutional review process ended in deadlock in the 1999-2003 legislative 
term. While the executive rejected the proposal to set up a Sovereign National Conference, 
the president’s opponents in the House supported the creation of the SNC as a tactical 
ploy to weaken the presidency even though the civil society’s SNC proposal was explicitly 
directed against the legislature.69 Thereafter, in each subsequent legislative term a new 
Joint Committee on the Review of the Constitution was set up, only to be taken hostage by 
disputes over protocol between the two chambers70 or other, more pressing political issues 
of the day.71 
Taking a closer look at the issues raised in the constitutional debates inside and outside 
the legislature, one realizes that none of these debates focused on civil-military relations, 
except for the government-installed Ebri Commission’s proposal to include an article retro-
actively sanctioning coup makers (Abia 2008:172). Yet, while the commission’s recom-
mendations to make coup attempts punishable as an act of treason and to empower every 
Nigerian to resist coups (ibid.:172) found support in the legislature and the public, they 
were not enacted, notably due to controversies over the inclusion of a constitutional clause 
on a third term at the request of President Obasanjo (ibid.:172). Otherwise, the constitu-
tional debates were dominated by issues not connected to civil-military relations such as 
federalism, the country’s electoral system, the shift to a semi-presidential system, the im-
munity clause, revenue allocation, state creation and the separation of powers.72 
Searching for explanations why civil-military relations played only a marginal role in the 
legislature’s constitutional debates, we repeatedly encountered the view among legislators 
and scholars that in this point the Constitution is clear beyond doubt.73 It putatively regu-
lates the functions of the armed forces comprehensively so that – except for a strengthen-
ing of the anti-coup clause - there is no urgent need for constitutional amendments. This 
view precisely reflects the position of former President Obasanjo who speaking at a gradu-
ation ceremony at the National Defense College in July 1999 emphasized that the constitu-
tion is “the main and supreme document defining the role of the armed forces” (Yoroms 
2005:178-179). 
Military Legislation under Executive Dominance   
All major steps towards military reform were – as we have seen – initiated soon after tran-
sition. Thereafter, except for persistent admonitions of the military by government repre-
sentatives to stay politically neutral, recognize civilian supremacy and re-professionalize, 
few serious additional initiatives to deepen military reforms were taken. One of them was 
the formation of a Military Transformation Committee in 2006 which was tasked “to change 
the mindset, capabilities, effectiveness, efficiency, training education, leadership and tradi-
tion of the military personnel.”74 But neither parliament nor any other civilian was involved 
in the committee. This means that the military continued to consider reform as an exclu-
sively internal affair with the assistance of the executive which effectively insulated such 
intra-governmental and intra-military debates from the scrutiny of both the Congress and 
public. It is thus hardly surprising that also National Defense Policy published by the gov-
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ernment in 2006 was drafted and passed without serious deliberation in the National As-
sembly. Like in the case of the Military Transformation Committee, the legislature was only 
briefed about the document by the Ministry of Defense and the Military Headquarters.75  
In the absence of civil society pressures also the legislature did little to keep military re-
forms going. An exception was a committee set up by House Speaker Na’Abba in the 
1999-2003 term to study the re-ordering of civil-military relations. The committee, chaired 
by a well-known academic, ultimately proposed four bills entrusting the military with devel-
opmental functions. Although the House of Representatives eventually passed the bills, 
there was no more time for the Senate to consider them before its term ended in early 
2003. The newly elected National Assembly never tabled them again.76 The bills were 
strongly associated with Speaker Na’Abbas, who had launched the most forceful of several 
impeachment challenges against President Obasanjo in August 2002 (Oyewo 2004:112). 
After surviving the challenge with the support of the Senate, Obasanjo did everything to 
thwart not only the re-election of Na’Abbas, but also to derail the latter’s legislative pro-
gram.77 During the first term, the assertiveness of the Congress manifested in the confron-
tation with President Obasanjo and not in relation to the military. 
Unlike military legislation in the Indonesian DPR, discussion of the four bills was hardly 
characterized by “competitive argumentation.” Attitudes of lawmakers towards the military 
were much less critical than in the Indonesian case. They converged in beliefs strongly 
influenced by early modernization theory. Legislators and academic advisors viewed the 
military as the best trained, most coherent and best organized Nigerian institution the pro-
fessional capacities of which should be harnessed for the society’s benefit in fields such as 
engineering, construction, medical services and disaster management. For them the mili-
tary knows much more about civil society than vice versa. They believed that such an ex-
tended mission would give the military dignity and distract it from political ambitions. By 
stressing the need to have a military with modern equipment and, hence, high fire power, 
these beliefs coincided with strong nationalist sentiments and great power aspirations 
widely shared by Nigerian politicians, intellectuals and the media.78 It goes without saying 
that with these views they found an open ear among military leaders who despite paying lip 
service to civilian supremacy still regard the military as an exceptional institution in the 
Nigerian polity. While such views certainly had the positive effect of acquiescing the armed 
forces, they also paved the way toward a Nigerian version of dwi fungsi and argued for 
military’s involvement in various policy fields, if not in politics. This at least may be con-
cluded from the National Defense Policy published by the government a few years later. 
The document states that “The involvement of the military in the executive functions of 
government need not to be limited to membership of [….] defense/security bodies. There-
fore, the expertise available in the military shall be harnessed in those areas that both the 
Executive and the National Assembly consider desirable” (Federal Government of Nigeria 
2006:53). Behind such views was a strategy of appeasement of the military by organizing 
and legitimizing access, at least in principle, to economically rewarding activities.  
In the 2003-2007 legislative term as well as in the current term, no military-related legisla-
tion of significance and with the prospect of becoming passed was initiated by the legisla-
ture. The National Assembly re-enacted the Nigerian Military Act, a decree first issued in 
1993 under military rule, albeit without any parliamentary debate. Thereafter, only feeble 
voices have been heard in the National Assembly calling for a revision of the Military Act.79 
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By the end of field work in March 2009, however, these overtures have not had tangible 
effects. Recently, the National Assembly also tabled a bill specifying the conditions under 
which the president is allowed to deploy troops for the purpose of quelling civil disturb-
ances, which, if passed, would increase the oversight powers of the National Assembly on 
force deployment.80 Another law renaming the National War College into National Defense 
College was mainly a symbolic exercise. A Freedom of Information Bill, legislation with the 
potential of significantly enhancing the supervisory power of the legislature and breaking 
the habit of the armed forces of hiding behind an aura of secrecy, was tabled by the first 
House of Representatives after the return to civilian rule as early as 1999 but enactment 
was prevented by presidential veto and a skeptical Senate. 81 
Other issues at least temporarily strongly contested between the legislature and the mili-
tary in Indonesia prior to the post-2004 stalemate on military reform, have not come on the 
agenda of the legislature in Nigeria, partly because at least on paper they were less am-
biguously regulated and partly because they did not exist to the same extent as in Indone-
sia. Crimes committed by military personnel, for instance, are tried by civilian courts and 
military court decisions are subject to Supreme Court review. Formal military business is 
not as extensive as in Indonesia. Even so, retired military officers are deeply entrenched in 
many business sectors and illicit income generation through oil bunkering and other forms 
of racketeering likewise constitutes a major problem only occasionally discussed by the 
legislature.82 There is also no territorial defense structure which would require restructur-
ing. 
National Security First: Oversight without Insight  
If the influence of the Indonesian parliament on military procurement was generally low, the 
Nigerian National Assembly was even less able to exert control over purchases of military 
equipment. The latter are largely controlled by the service chiefs and to a lesser extent by 
the Chief of Defense Staff and the Defense Ministry. Changes in procurement rules under 
the democratic regime are thus mainly procedural. Unlike before, military representatives 
are now obliged to appear before the defense-related committees of the National Assem-
bly and defend the need for the envisioned acquisitions and their costs. Yet, even though a 
military unused to public oversight initially found parliamentary hearings offending, the 
impact of the legislature on actual procurement decisions is very limited. Until publication 
of a National Defense Policy or White Book in 2006, the legislature virtually lacked criteria 
to evaluate the envisioned purchases (Yoroms 2005; Omitoogun 2006). But an even 
greater obstacle for effective parliamentary control of military procurement is the habit of 
the armed forces to withhold essential information from the legislators on the ground of 
national security concerns.83 Even more than in Indonesia, the legislature is virtually pow-
erless when the military resorts – in the Obasanjo era often with the support of the presi-
dency via an executive order (Omitoogun 2006:258) – to financing military equipment from 
extra-budgetary sources. Especially the Nigerian military’s frequent and extensive peace-
keeping missions have often been financed from extra-budgetary sources (Omitoogun 
2003:86).  
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In our research we encountered only one publicized case in which the National Assembly 
was able to block purchases of military hardware. According to Garba, in October 2002 the 
National Assembly refused to appropriate some N55 billion for the purchase of ammuni-
tion. The legislature feared that the executive had belligerent intentions after the Interna-
tional Court of Justice had ruled in favor of Cameroon in the dispute over the Bakassi pen-
insula (Garba 2008:183). While we cannot discount the possibility that parliamentary scru-
tiny may have influenced other procurement decisions in more discreet ways (although we 
have not found evidence for it), the main difference to Indonesia is the National Assembly’s 
inability or unwillingness to publicize procurement irregularities. Defense committee meet-
ings take place behind closed doors and only terse and unreliable information often pro-
vided by anonymous sources reaches the public via the media.  
Most of the committee work concentrated on the defense budget by screening the budget-
ary proposals of the Defense Ministry. Yet, the ability of the legislature to supervise the 
military budget effectively is severely hampered by a number of factors. First, budgetary 
data are often submitted late to the National Assembly, giving the legislators only short 
time to scrutinize the figures (Hettmann & Mohammed 2005:23). Second, the data often 
come without explanation and only with rudimentary cost estimates. Legislators, for in-
stance, regularly approve the expenditures of the armed forces for personnel, without 
knowing the precise troop strength (Omitoogun & Hutchful 2006:175). And, third, to an 
even greater extent than in Indonesia, the legislature is unable to control actual defense 
spending. Nigeria’s auditing laws are outdated, full of loopholes, and the Auditor-General is 
a political appointee of the presidency and hence lacks discretion in his judgments. Presi-
dent Obasanjo’s decision not to reappoint a recalcitrant auditor-general in February 2003 
was precedent setting in this regard. The decision came in response to a report critical of 
government spending which the auditor-general had dared to submit to the legislature 
(Oyewo 2004:117). Aggravating the legislature’s predicament is the late submission of 
auditing reports which usually come two or more years after the end of the respective fiscal 
year (Omitoogun & Hutchful 2006:162-168). Moreover, military spending from extra-
budgetary sources and secret funds is not included in the auditing reports.  
Inspection tours may be popular among legislators, because they entitle them to generous 
allowances, but as already argued in the case of Indonesia, they are hardly an effective 
method to uplift the legislature’s supervisory performance. The weak supervisory power of 
the legislature is evidenced by the fact that only between 30 and 50 percent of the ap-
proved budget is actually implemented.84 Cases where the executive withholds funds ear-
marked by the legislature are widespread. It is public knowledge in Nigeria that the heads 
of agencies only reluctantly release the appropriated funds and often bag the year-end’s 
surplus for private enrichment.85 As this practice constitutes a cascade reaching from the 
top to the lowest level of an agency, one can imagine why very little government funding 
reaches the grassroots level and why complaints about the dilapidated state of military 
barracks and the poor living conditions of ordinary soldiers outside the big cities persist 
(Fayemi 2002:115; Omitoogun 2003:86).86 It is under these circumstances no surprise that 
many observers rated the legislature’s control over the defense budget very low in the 
initial years of the new democracy. Yoroms, for instance, concludes that the “defense 
budget since 1999 has been approved without serious and critical oversight” (Yoroms 
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2005:192) and Omitoogun rates Nigeria as one of five African countries with low adher-
ence to good budgetary practices (Omitoogun 2006:258).87 
Apart from budget control there were certainly other areas of oversight in which the legisla-
ture engaged. In November 1999, the Senate conducted an investigation of the deploy-
ment of military troops to the village of Odi in Bayelsa State which followed the killing of 
twelve policemen in a local conflict. The military intervention resulted in great physical 
destruction and up to 500 civilians died. Despite the creation of an ad-hoc committee in-
vestigating the killings,88 the Senate played only a minor role in the ensuing public debate 
over military abuses as the virtual non-existence of press reports on the Senate activities 
shows. Moreover, Senate criticism was more directed against the President’s constitutional 
right to deploy troops in cases of emergencies than against military brutality per se. The 
House passed a resolution against the troop deployments to Bayelsa State89 and ordered 
the Committee on Defense to investigate the case. However, parliamentary records do not 
disclose anything about the committee’s findings and the case did not seem to have resur-
faced on the plenary agenda. Three years later, the House instrumentalized the Odi case, 
together with a similar, subsequent case of military abuses in Zaki Biam (Benue State) in 
its impeachment bid against President Obasanjo. Again, at center stage of the critique was 
the President, not the military. This was hardly surprising as, at the same time, the House 
opposition against Obasanjo silently sought to lobby the military for supporting Obasanjo’s 
impeachment.90 Odi and Zaki Biam ceased to be on the parliamentary agenda after the 
impeachment bid against Obasanjo was eventually derailed. The power struggle with the 
presidency left the legislature weakened as the president tried to install a more loyal House 
leadership in the coming legislative terms.  
Also in recent years the oversight performance of the Nigerian legislature did not improve 
significantly. Supervisory functions are still way below the level needed for establishing a 
solid base for second generation military reforms. Like in the past, defense-related commit-
tees spent most of their time for budget scrutiny. The House Committee on Defense’s de-
cision to return the 2009 draft defense budget to the Ministry of Defense for 2009 for revi-
sion and re-submission was a rare departure from previous docile behavior. Whether this 
signals a more assertive stance of the committee towards the ministry remains to be seen. 
Yet, many of the problems haunting effective budgetary oversight persist. Most of the scru-
tiny concentrates on secondary issues such as arrears of the armed forces, their electricity 
bill, medical allowances and rent subsidy.91 Other questionable practices known from the 
past also continue unabated. One such practice is that committees of the National Assem-
bly conduct budgetary and other inquiries surplace at the Defense Ministry and the Military 
Headquarters. While legislators argue that the visit provides them with additional first-hand 
insights,92 the fact that such hearings are sponsored by those to be scrutinized (Garba 
2008:188) does not augur well for the independence and rigor of the inquiry. After all, the 
practice that legislators accept favors from agencies they are supposed to supervise 
seems to be widespread.93 Even worse is the often alleged practice of legislators to extol 
money from members of the executive who need legislative endorsement for their ap-
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pointment or seek approval of their budget proposal.94 Even if charges in this respect have 
not been aired publicly in the case of the defense-related committees, the mere existence 
of such practices in the House discredits the National Assembly as a supervisory body. 
Moreover, in the absence of a credible auditing process, budgetary oversight remains a 
largely futile and symbolic exercise with little effect on the actual spending behavior of the 
Nigerian armed forces. Yet, to the credit of the National Assembly it must be said that the 
House of Representatives recently targeted these problems and pressured agencies with a 
budget surplus at year-end to return the unspent money to the Ministry of Finance.95 
Whether the House is able to sustain this agenda or whether it is only a smart public rela-
tions stunt of its Speaker to shore up his public image, remains to be observed in the fu-
ture. 
So far, the Nigerian legislature also tacitly accepted the practice of the president of ap-
pointing the service chiefs without consulting the National Assembly (Garba 2008). It even 
seems that until the issue was brought up by a disgruntled military officer and a Lagos-
based lawyer in August 2008,96 the National Assembly was not even aware of this right, 
which is granted to it by Article 20 of the Military Act. Legislators interviewed argued that 
the public scrutiny of the designated defense chiefs would unnecessarily politicize military 
promotion.97 This shows that legislators adopt the rhetorical frames by which the military 
legitimizes their exclusion from information flows and oversight. 
Apart from budgetary oversight, much of the committee work concentrates on the hearing 
of petitions submitted by aggrieved retired military officers complaining about unjust dis-
missal or non-payment of pension funds. The latter is a persistent problem in the light of 
thousands of prematurely retired soldiers. Soldiers are retired if they do not pass promotion 
exams, on disciplinary grounds without being cashiered, when the armed forces decide 
that the services of an officer are no longer required, for medical reasons or if they have 
merely been bypassed in the promotion process by junior officers (Yesufu 2005:53-54). 
But while prematurely retired senior officers usually settle in private business, lower rank-
ing officers often end up stranded in unemployment. The National Assembly has respond-
ed to the problem, which in some cases led to violent protests of the retirees, by passing 
resolutions calling on the government for a quick settlement of the problem. Unfortunately, 
however, as the recurrence of the problem demonstrates, these resolutions had no tangi-
ble and lasting effect.  
Similarly proliferative is the habit of the National Assembly to exert oversight through reso-
lutions. The latter are usually derided by the public as instruments without teeth and largely 
ignored by the targeted government agencies. In conclusion it is thus evident that the Na-
tional Assembly is far from reaching the supervisory capacity needed to serve as founda-
tion for second generation military reforms.  
The Stalemate Persists: The Nigerian National Assembly between Self-
Aggrandizement and Isomorphic Behavior  
The limited contribution of the Nigerian legislature to first generation military reforms has 
often been excused with the legislature’s late start among the country’s major political 
institutions. In an interview with Newswatch Magazine, former Senator Udoma complained 
                                                            
94  See Garba (2008:197) and Newswatch, 15 November 2004, pp. 14-23; The Guardian, 23 March 2005, p. 1.  
95  Daily Trust, 4 September 2008, p. 1; The Nation, 20 February 2009, p. 31; Tell, 23 February 2009, p. 29; Vanguard, 
27 February 2009, p. 1. 
96  The Guardian, 9 June 2008. 
97  Authors’ interviews, 24 February 2009, 2 March 2009. 
46 
that when the legislature started, “there were not enough offices, offices were not fur-
nished, and there was no parliamentary staff.”98 While this may be true, a greater obstacle 
was the absence of a legislative culture, ethics, procedural routines and expert knowledge 
in areas such as budgeting and lawmaking. Neither did the highly fragmented and un-
wieldy committee system boost the National Assembly’s legislative and supervisory per-
formance. Mainly for patronage reasons, there are no less than eighty committees in the 
House of Representatives and fifty-four committees in the Senate, often with overlapping 
functions. Four of the House committees deal with defense and eight with security issues, 
while in the Senate three committees cover defense and five security matters. Most legisla-
tors are members of five to six committees,99 greatly limiting their ability to contribute 
meaningfully to committee proceedings and to build up expertise. Compared to the Indo-
nesian DPR’s first two terms after the transition to democracy (1999-2004 and 2004-2009), 
there are fewer lawmakers in the Nigerian National Assembly who have specialized on 
defense issues. The highly hierarchical structure of the committees, vesting disproportion-
ate powers and resources in the committee chairmen, and the fluctuating membership of 
the committees further weaken their effectiveness. Defense-related committees also meet 
less frequently than Komisi I in the DPR, expert support for the committees is less elabo-
rate and committee meetings are usually ignored by the media and the public. Hearings 
take place but in most cases do not include members of academia, partly due to the aura 
of secrecy in which the military shrouds defense issues, and partly because they are be-
lieved lacking expertise in military affairs, an image that military officers also convey to the 
legislators.100 Moreover, with the bi-cameral structure of the Nigerian Assembly, the Senate 
often acts as an additional veto player which slows down lawmaking. 
While these problems may explain some of the Nigerian legislature’s shortcomings in the 
field of military reform, they are definitely not a question of resource shortages. Despite a 
fierce dispute with President Obasanjo the National Assembly defended its right to prepare 
its budget. It has thus defended greater resource autonomy than the Indonesian DPR 
which is entirely dependent on government budgeting (Sherlock 2003:28). Right from the 
beginning the National Assembly clashed frequently with the executive over the budgets it 
appropriated for itself which the president considered as utterly extravagant (Aiyede 
2005:79). A comparison with the Indonesian DPR’s resources shows that the National 
Assembly was indeed lavishly funded. While the DPR had a budget of approximately 
US$211 million in 2009 and US$240 million in 2010,101 the Nigerian National Assembly 
received approximately US$933 million in 2008102 and US$741 million in 2009,103 a five to 
sevenfold increase since 2000 (Aiyede 2005:79). This is at par with the budget of major 
federal ministries as a comparison with the defense budget suggests: In 2009, for instance, 
the legislature appropriated US$1.30 billion for defense.104  
On first sight, this seems to suggest that the National Assembly has abundant resources to 
build up a well-functioning parliamentary support infrastructure. Yet, numerous accounts 
show that over 80 percent105 of its budget is allocated for personal emoluments of the leg-
islators.106 Legislators justify their enormous remunerations and benefits with “the need for 
a living wage to ensure honesty and dignity of the office holders.”107 No wonder, with the 
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material stakes thus high, that legislative elections have been criticized as fraud-ridden and 
unfair.108 
The legislature’s credibility is further eroded by a string of scandals shaking the institution 
from its very beginning in 1999. These include forgery of educational qualifications, indis-
criminate waste of public funds for status symbols and patronage purposes and money 
politics. The latter is endemic in the race for legislative leadership positions.  
Summing up, the malfunctions of the Nigerian legislature were much less caused by re-
source constraints than by an abundance of resources. Overall, the problematic internal 
structure, dominance of the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the latter’s centralistic 
and hierarchical structure, re-election ratios of only about 20 percent, high fluctuation of 
committee membership, rivalry between the two chambers of the legislature and a preva-
lence of money politics have strongly compromised its legislative and supervisory perfor-
mance. 
Resulting from the fact that first generation military reform became deadlocked as early as 
by 2000, in Nigeria the road towards second generation reforms is longer and thornier than 
in Indonesia. The National Assembly’s contribution to complete first generation military 
reforms and to initiate second generation military reforms is strongly circumscribed by its 
isomorphic behavior which largely recognizes the military’s normative foundations, even if 
in the more recent past signs of a more assertive behavior could be observed. However, 
the latter is still too feeble as to go beyond a rather shallow process of supervision and to 
enter into “competitive argumentation” over more advanced military reforms.  
The generally docile attitude of Nigerian legislators towards the military is reinforced by a 
similar nationalist discourse as in Indonesia. Nigerian politicians also often propagate vi-
sions of Nigeria as a Great Power. Like in Indonesia, claims for Great Power status are 
driven by a sentiment of frustrated entitlement and chiefly rest on the country’s size and 
large population. It is exemplified in Nigeria’s extensive participation in peace-keeping 
missions which magnify the country’s international status and, at the same time, require a 
strong and effective military organization. Not unexpectedly thus, Nigerian legislators have 
been similarly accommodating as their Indonesian counterparts in approving considerable 
increases of the defense budget, even though the latter is – like in Indonesia – hovering 
around a low level of only approximately 1 percent of the GDP (Fayemi & Olonisakin 
2008:253). 
Apart from this, Nigeria faces similar security threats as Indonesia. There is perceived 
encroachment on Nigerian territory by neighbors like in the case of the Bakassi peninsula 
and there are major internal security disturbances such as the recent ethnic and religious 
unrest in Jos, Bauchi and Maiduguri, terrorist attacks and the protracted rebellion in the 
Niger Delta. All this, too, requires a strong military. Given the long period of military rule, 
the military’s legacy as guarantor of national unity, which draws from its victory in the Bia-
fran secession war and the seemingly better training of military officers, have created an 
inferiority complex among civilian politicians which stifles a more vocal call for additional 
reforms.109 And, even more than in Indonesia, there is the ubiquitous retired military officer 
who is well entrenched in local politics, business and the legislature. These persons, 
though not necessarily identifying with the corporate interests of the incumbent military 
leadership, due to their professional knowledge also markedly influence parliamentary 
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interaction with the military thereby exacerbating the latter’s docile behavior. Isomorphic 
behavior remains entrenched in the legislature as long as former generals such as Senate 
President David Mark can publicly claim that “only soldiers have the discipline to nurture 
the nation’s fledgling democracy. The core civilians are lazy and dull. An army sergeant is 
more intelligent than a university graduate” (Amaike 2007:192).110 Such statements and 
others where legislators openly called for the military to take over in times of crisis such as 
Senator Waku in an interview with Tell magazine were not heard of publicly in Indonesia.111 
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6.  Conclusion 
Our comparative analysis stressed the centrality of interaction as a causal mechanism 
determining actor constitution and institutional change. Our findings revealed that different 
patterns of legislature-military interaction emerged in Indonesia and Nigeria. This is the 
result of variation in the way “causation” had worked both in our synchronic (between-
cases) and diachronic (within-cases) comparisons as well as with regard to substantive 
issue-areas constitutive of parliamentary-military interaction. We argued that causation 
processes are contingent on past dependencies, conditions of interaction, and ideational 
resources informing both actors’ arguments and “intersubjective structures” prevailing in 
“cognitive priors” and established norms. We will further present these multiple variances 
in the constitution of parliamentary “actorness” with regard to military affairs in Indonesia 
and Nigeria according to time, issue-areas and modes of interaction.    
The time analysis showed that the three phases – regime change, transition, and demo-
cratic consolidation - do not perfectly overlap although they can be identified both in Indo-
nesia and Nigeria. No perfect time overlap shows that there is a different weighting of fac-
tors and causation dynamics shaping actors’ constitution. For instance, the phase of re-
gime change was quite short in Indonesia, leading to a breakup of the hegemony of the 32-
year old autocratic Suharto regime, which was hastily followed by a “pacted” transition 
under President Habibie. Nigeria did not experience this kind of breakup, but after the un-
expected death of military dictator Abacha it entered a pretty long period of regime change 
of about 10 months under General Abubakar during which the military had systematically, 
without much public debate and in coincidence with its corporate interests, organized the 
de facto power handover to civilians. The conditions allowing the Nigerian legislature to 
directly engage in “communicative action” with the military or to provide an arena of inter-
action for political opposition, public and expert communities to challenge the the military 
and old normative grounds were not in place as, at the time of regime change, Nigeria had 
no parliament at all. Moreover, variation also exists with regard to the role of the military in 
the ancien regime. While in Indonesia the military was the main associate and guardian of 
Suharto’s autocracy, the military in Nigeria became the sole ruling class enjoying absolute 
control over the country. This created from the onset an unchallenged powerful position for 
the Nigerian military in re-structuring the political system during the regime change. This 
situation is not matched by the Indonesian military prior to 1998. Here, the military had 
shared power with other sections of the political elite and already found itself under strong 
domestic and international critique throughout the1990s, so well before the downfall of 
Suharto. Therefore, the Indonesian military experienced a situation of competition with 
other elite groups and contestation by the public prior to regime change which laid down 
the necessary conditions for “communicative action” and “competitive argumentation” to 
manifest. 
Furthermore, the second phase of transition was considerably longer in Indonesia than in 
Nigeria. This is of extraordinary relevance because, presumably, this is the phase of most 
intensive interaction on substantive issues of military reform and political re-structuring with 
major impact on the last phase of democratic consolidation. In Indonesia, it may be subdi-
vided into a first highly dynamic period of 3 years (1999-2002), followed by another 2 years 
(2002-2004) of slow down and obvious shift into stalemate. Indonesia thus took about 5 
years of intense “competitive argumentation” between DPR and TNI for achieving im-
portant military reforms. In marked contrast to Indonesia, Nigeria experienced only a very 
short phase of just a few months of military reform under President Obasanjo in 1999, 
when the Nigerian executive implemented a number of reforms without any involvement of 
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the legislature or other societal and expert actors. However, our findings illustrate that 
there is considerable gap in the quality of these reforms in Indonesia and Nigeria. Moreo-
ver, parliamentary “actorness” in the military reform process during the transition phase is 
diametrically opposed. While the Indonesian parliament was quasi the “maker and pusher” 
of military reforms, also due to the influence of non-parliamentary pro-reformist forces, in 
advisory capacity, on legislative decision-making and deliberation process, the Nigerian 
Congress was largely side-tracked by President Obasanjo’s grip on the military reform 
process.  
Finally, the third phase of democratic consolidation is in both cases characterized by 
stalemate of military reform leading to an unfinished implementation of first generation 
reforms and the impossibility to embark on second generation reforms which would have 
solidly entrenched parliamentary “actorness” in military affairs. However, the deadlock 
manifests in different ways.  
Variation also exists with regard to substantive issues constitutive of legislature-military 
interaction in Indonesia and Nigeria. These issue-areas include: constitutional review and 
inclusion of constitutional provisions forbidding military’s political involvement, military re-
form legislation, supervision and involvement in debates on defense policy and past hu-
man rights abuses by the military or the military re-professionalization. With the exception 
of thin supervision of military budget and military operations in internal and international 
contexts, the Nigerian Congress had no significant contribution to any other aspect of mili-
tary reform or democratization of the political system. These dimensions of military reform 
were addressed to a certain extent in Nigeria too, but primarily by the executive or the 
military itself. In sharp contrast to the Indonesian parliament, the Nigerian Congress thus 
dispelled almost no “actorness” at all with regard to substantive issues of military reform 
and defense affairs. Nor can formal supervision discarded of any critical or investigatory 
spirit by Nigerian Congress constitute a serious claim to parliamentary “actorness.”  
The military reform in Nigeria is the result of isomorphic adaptation to foreign norms by the 
military itself and the executive which has precluded any substantial legislature-military 
interaction from emerging. It is precisely this absence of interaction that explains the poor 
performance of the Nigerian Congress in developing “actorness” capacity in military affairs. 
Moreover, even though military reform stalemated in both countries during the last phase 
of democratic consolidation, the meaning of deadlock for the degree of parliamentary “ac-
torness” has to be differently weighted. The activism and involvement of the Indonesian 
parliament in the military reform has created a solid political culture of legislative control 
and it has legitimized public scrutiny and transparence over military affairs. Moreover, it 
has relaxed Indonesian military’s reluctance to communicate with legislatures and non-
governmental epistemic groups. In spite of the new normative convergence between legis-
lature (as well as broader public opinion) and military on nationalist grounds due to “consti-
tutive localization,” there is undoubtedly an important consciousness of entitlement by DPR 
to own the right of interference in military affairs and containment of TNI’s ambitions to 
institutional autonomy. We can thus speak of a level of “parliamentarization” of military 
affairs in Indonesia while a similar performance is not yet matched by the Nigerian Con-
gress. Abstracting from our findings following propositions may be derived for generating 
hypotheses for further research on a broader case basis and/or quantitative analysis. 
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1.) Legislatures do matter in the process of advancing military reform. But their impact 
is conditioned by several factors. One important factor is the mode of transition 
from the erstwhile authoritarian regime to a democratic order. Chances that the 
legislature becomes a major player in military reform increase, if a legislature ex-
isted before regime change, if this legislature was more than a mere rubber 
stamp, if it had developed a viable institutional infrastructure and if it had a role in 
the process of transition. Moreover, the absorption capacity of legislatures towards 
reformist ideas through establishing formal but also informal institutional channels 
of communication and exchange with broader societal and political actors (civil 
society, media, epistemic communities, extra-parliamentary opposition), especially 
throughout the transition period, are factors supportive of the capacity of legisla-
tures to become actors in the process of military reform and oversight. The in-
creasing anti-reformist and status-quo attitude of the Indonesia DPR in the third 
phase of parliament-military interaction are indicative of a loss in its informal ca-
pacity and disposition to integrate extra-parliamentary pro-reformist views and pol-
icy aims. Instead, the same informal channels have been increasingly utilized by 
the military in order to ensure its insulation from democratic control and transpar-
ency. 
2.) If new foreign and old local ideas clash in a situation of acute crisis, they may trig-
ger a process of “communicative action.” As “communicative action” is highly con-
ditional, the prospects for an immediate wholesale normative transformation of the 
older order and thus far-reaching and comprehensive military reform are quite 
dim. 
3.) More likely is it that in a situation of severe crisis and/or great insecurity ”commu-
nicative action” facilitates an agreement among actors that a major institutional 
change based on a new normative foundation is required to cope with the situa-
tion. As the normative consensus is preliminary and disagreement over institution-
al arrangements of the new order prevails, a process of “competitive argumenta-
tion” ensues which is characterized by compromises between the legislature and 
the military protagonists and which enable partial progress towards military reform. 
4.) If the new democracy faces major problems in consolidating (that is, when the ex-
pectations associated with the new order do not materialize, if major international 
context factors change in favor of the military or if the civilian politicians reinvigor-
ate the military establishment through instrumentalizing the armed forces in power 
struggles), the likelihood increases that the scope for compromise on the part of 
the military is exhausted. A stalemate in legislature-military interactions emerges. 
In this case several paths of action are possible: Under favorable conditions a re-
sumption of “competitive argumentation” and the continuation of military reform is 
possible. Another possibility is that “competitive argumentation” degenerates into 
“controversial argumentation” or “pseudo argumentation,” which may initiate a 
phase of political instability and turmoil, a process which may end in an authoritar-
ian reversal. However, given the high costs of such an option, it is more likely that 
the protagonists search for a new normative consensus.  
5.) Such a normative accommodation is most likely if protagonists agree on a fusion 
of old and new ideas. This localization revalidates older norms, but does not un-
dermine the earlier consensus for ending authoritarian rule and establishing a 
democratic regime. Yet, it weighs the institutional arrangements in favor of the mil-
itary, preserves some or many of its reserved domains and ends the process of 
military reform for the more immediate future. 
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6.) Where the military was deeply entrenched in society, where weak parliamentary 
foundations exist, where due to external pressures a reform movement driven by 
civil society reform is non-existent or weak, and where regime change was a basi-
cally unilateral decision by the ancien regime (including the military), there is a 
great likelihood that the exponents of the ancien regime, but also the newly 
emerging elected representatives, basically content themselves with isomorphic 
behavior. They mimic democratic institutions and military reform without markedly 
changing the “cognitive prior.” The legislature’s impact on military reform is very 
limited in such a case. 
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List of Abbreviations 
 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
ABRI Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Armed 
 Forces) 
BPK Badan Pemeriska Keuangan (State Auditing Board), Indonesia 
DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (Indonesian Parliament) 
DPRDs Regional Representative Bodies, Indonesia 
EU European Union 
GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement), Indonesia 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
Komisi I Parliamentary Commission for Foreign Affairs, Communication 
 and Defense, Indonesian Parliament 
Maj. Gen. Major General 
MPR Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (Consultative People’s 
 Assembly), Indonesia 
MPRI Military Professional Resources Incorporated, US 
PAN Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party), Indonesia 
PDI Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democrat Party)  
PDI-P  Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democrat-
ic Party of Struggle), Indonesia  
PDP People’s Democratic Party, Nigeria 
PDS Partai Damai Sejahtera (Prosperous Peace Party), Indonesia 
PKI Communist Party of Indonesia 
PPD Democratic Vanguard Star, Indonesia 
PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party), 
 Indonesia 
PRC Provisional Ruling Council, Nigeria 
SNC Sovereign National Conference, Nigeria 
TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces) 
TSTB Supervisory Team for the Transformation of TNI Businesses, 
 Indonesia 
UN United Nations 
US Unites States 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
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